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The increasing volume and sophistication of cyber-attacks, the adoption of virtualization 
technology, and the slow incorporation of new software on Navy networks has created a 
unique situation. The status quo has left those responsible for administering and 
defending Navy networks at a distinct disadvantage. They are unable to leverage  current 
triage tools available to assist in the identification, classification, and recovery aspects of 
incident response on a computer network. At the same time, their adversaries have no 
such limitations. This capstone report explores the use of native operating system tools 
along with mirrored domains in a virtualized environment as a possible strategy to 
provide these capabilities. 
For this project, we created a generalized virtual network with mirrored domains. 
In this environment, we developed a toolkit, comprised of software already available to 
administrators, and a method for deploying it. We then demonstrated its efficacy in 
detecting a compromise by inserting malware into a computer in the environment. 
Finally, we used the mirrored domains within the environment to provide a means for an 
accelerated recovery. Used together, this native toolset and recovery strategy provide a 
possible solution for the detection of and response to incidents on a network. 
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The Department of the Navy (DON) is notoriously slow at updating and 
implementing new software in its computer networks. This is evidenced by the fact that 
the Navy has a plan in place to continue using Microsoft’s Windows XP on its networks 
until the year 2017 [1]. This extends the use of a single Operating System (OS) to over 
sixteen years. This trend applies to security software as well. The current Department of 
Defense (DOD) certification and accreditation process is not poised to utilize many 
current products.   
There is one major change on the horizon for Navy networks, and that is 
virtualization. The introduction of the Navy Tactical Cloud (NTC) and Consolidated 
Afloat Network and Enterprise Services (CANES) both leverage virtualization 
technology to help in the streamlining of operations and reduction of costs. Together 
these represent the future of Navy networking and a fundamental shift in network 
infrastructure. Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) recently issued 
contracts for the production phase of CANES spanning eight years and amounting to 2.5 
billion dollars [2]. 
While Navy networks are slow to change, attackers are constantly leveraging 
newer technology and practices. Current trends show that new malware is being 
discovered at an escalating rate [3]. Along with the growing volume of attacks, the 
increasing level of sophistication of these attacks is another cause for concern. According 
to a Frost and Sullivan white paper, many of the newer compromises are generated by 
state-sponsored and criminal organizations using long term, multistage attacks known as 
Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) [4].   
The previously discussed areas present a problem. The combination of the slow 
adoption of new software, along with the rapid evolution of malware leaves those in 
charge of managing Navy networks at a distinct disadvantage. They are required to 
ensure the security of Navy information Systems (IS), but are denied some of the most 
powerful tools available to do so. At the same time, the introduction of virtualization 
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provides more opportunities and flexibility in network configuration. It is with these 
issues in mind that we designed this project. 
A. OBJECTIVES 
We had several objectives in mind when undertaking this project. For one, we 
wanted to create a reproducible enterprise network environment. Within this environment 
we wanted to develop a toolset available to Navy personnel for identifying and 
classifying compromises in the security of computers on the network. While doing so, we 
kept in mind the lack of specialized software available to Navy network administrators. 
We wanted to demonstrate how these tools could be used to efficiently detect the 
presence of a compromise on the network. Once the compromise has been determined, 
we wanted to present a possible recovery strategy using mirrored domains and Virtual 
Local Area Networks (VLAN) when responding to an incident on the network. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
In order to meet our objectives we took the following steps. We performed a 
review of some of the available products used in computer triage. This was done to 
examine the capabilities that were currently available and to determine what information 
our toolset could provide. From there we began to design and implement our scaled-down 
enterprise network. We utilized an ESXi server cluster to create a completely virtualized 
network. Inside of this network environment we assembled a toolkit comprised of 
operating system executables and software from the Microsoft Sysinternals suite. After 
that, we then inserted malware onto a host in the network to simulate a compromise. We 
then employed these tools to gather information relevant for detecting a compromise 
from all of the machines in the network remotely. Next, we used the information gathered 
from the tools to provide the evidence and nature of the compromise. While doing so we 
also provided an analytical framework for examining the output of the tools. Finally, with 
the compromise of the network determined, we demonstrated the capability of mirrored 




This project provides two significant benefits. First it provides a toolset that can 
be employed by administrators on Navy networks. Since it only utilizes software 
packaged with the operating system and the Sysinternals suite, it is readily available on 
all systems. We also created a means for deploying them remotely, expediting the process 
of identifying and classifying incidents on a network. This project also provides a tested 
strategy that could be used to aid in the expedited recovery of compromised computers 
within a virtual network. 
D. REPORT STRUCTURE 
Chapter I presents the objectives and scope of this project. It provides an 
overview of the methods that were used in the development and implementation of the 
test environment. Finally, it states the benefit of this project to both the DON and the 
DOD as a whole. 
Chapter II is a review of triage implementations currently in use for security 
compromises. It examines the processes and tools being used in the corporate world. 
Examples include Mandiant’s Intelligent Response (MIR), and Palo Alto Network’s 
WildFire. Next it reviews how entities in the government, specifically the DON, are 
performing triage on their networks. Finally, it describes a very specific form of triage 
known as Rapid Enterprise Triaging (RETRI), which was the springboard for the 
development of this project. 
Chapter III defines the virtualized environment in which this project was 
accomplished. It provides a network schematic defining the domains and forest structure. 
It describes the numbers of machines used, their OS, configuration, and services 
provided. It also defines the setup and configuration of the routing and switching in the 
ESXi environment. 
Chapter IV details the tools used in the detection and classification portion of this 
project. It looks closely at many of the native operating system tools and their expected 
outputs. It also reviews additional tools such, Microsoft Sysinternals, and their ability to 
shed further light on potential security compromises of the systems on a virtualized 
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network through the comparison of baseline outputs with compromised outputs. Finally, 
the chapter explains the methods we used to employ these tools. 
Chapter V examines the malware that was used to create the compromise on the 
network. We look at the background of the malware and define its capabilities. It also 
covers the server and client portions of the malware. Finally, it provides the details of our 
specific implementation of the malware. 
Chapter VI provides an in-depth analysis of the results obtained through the use 
of the defined tools. It compares and contrasts the baseline outputs with those outputs 
obtained after the malware is inserted. This defines the indicators that personnel should 
be able to recognize in determining if there has been a network compromise. Finally, it 
demonstrates the capability of VLAN mirroring to allow a rapid recovery from a 
compromise, while still enabling examination of the compromised assets. 
Chapter VII summarizes our project. It outlines what we have accomplished and 
the areas of work that remain for future research. 
  
 4 
II. CURRENT TRIAGE PRODUCTS 
In order to ensure our toolkit provided the necessary capabilities to identify and 
classify compromises in a network we needed to examine the idea of computer triage. In 
addition to the conceptual review, we researched some of the current products available 
providing triage capabilities to network administrators and security professionals in order 
to guide the development of our toolset. 
A. TRIAGE 
The term triage is most often used in the medical field. It is the assignment of 
degrees of urgency to wounds or illnesses to decide the order of treatment of a large 
number of casualties. Computer security has recently adopted the term as well. The 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) includes triage 
as one of the phases in the incident handling process, and further divides triage into three 
sub-phases: verification, initial classification and assignment [5]. Triage is most often 
used to determine which systems require the most urgent action, when there are multiple 
computers on a network that have been compromised. This provides a framework for 
incident responders to determine a course of action when responding to the compromise.   
B. LOCAL TRIAGE 
The American cyber security firm Mandiant provides remote forensics and 
incident response services. For local capabilities, i.e., those requiring physical access to a 
potentially compromised machine, Mandiant offers Redline, a free tool enabling an 
analyst to discover Indicator of Compromise (IOCs) via memory and file analysis [6]. 
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the Redline process. Mandiant recommends that its 
Redline be used via a physically connected USB flash drive that is moved from machine 
to machine. This tool used on its own is an example of local triage in that it allows for an 
assessment of a computer’s security status, but it requires physically accessing each 
machine to do so. It works well for a local network with a small numbers of computers to 
maintain and investigate. However, physically traveling from system to system to 
conduct such an assessment would be time consuming and costly, and is impractical in 
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most enterprise network environments. Also, given the inherent risk of migrating 
malware from host to host via USB droppers, this method of surveying devices could not 
only violate network policies, but could also spread malware.   
 
Figure 1.  Mandiant Redline tool overview, from [6]. 
C. REMOTE TRIAGE 
The next step in the evolution of computer triage is remote triage. Remote Triage 
is a security analysis technique used by incident responders to investigate potential 
unauthorized access and other anomalous behavior on endpoint systems within a 
network.   The key aspect of remote triage is effectively assessing the security status of a 
computer without having to physically visit the machine. Remote triage often involves 
the use of software which is centrally located on a network resource and is able to be 
deployed onto client machines to automatically gather information. This data is then 
retrieved and processed by a dedicated analysis machine [7]. The remainder of this 
chapter presents some of the current implementations of remote triage in both the 
commercial sector and the Department of Defense. 
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1. Mandiant 
In addition to the free Redline tool, Mandiant offers the Mandiant Intelligent 
Response (MIR) service. This gives customers the ability to remotely investigate client 
devices on their network [8]. While these two tools can be used in conjunction, to use 
Redline remotely requires MIR services. The Mandiant website does not elaborate on the 
underlying technical mechanics of the capabilities of these products.  Mandiant 
Intelligent Response and Redline combined is one example of remote triage being used in 
the private sector. 
2. Palo Alto Networks 
Another example of remote triage is Palo Alto Network’s WildFire. Several 
features distinguish this product. Detection and triage are completely automated within 
the WildFire software. WildFire resides on dedicated hardware and has access to their 
cloud-based service which can be deployed privately within the customer’s network or 
accessed over the Internet. Rather than using signatures and predefined actions to 
diagnose malware, WildFire uses behavioral analysis. Suspicious software is sent to a 
cloud-based sandbox capable of detecting over one hundred malicious behaviors. Once 
the malware is classified, WildFire generates protections to block the threat and shares 
this data with all WildFire subscribers across the globe within one hour [9]. This results 
in an expedited process of detection, diagnosis and correction. Figure 2 illustrates the 
WildFire process in handling the discovery of malware. 
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Figure 2.  WildFire process from detection to correction, from [10] 
3. Department of Defense 
The United States Department of Defense developed a remote triage tool suite known as 
Blue Scope. It is deployed on a laptop physically connected to the network being triaged, 
which allows the security analyst to remotely access every endpoint device on the 
LAN. Remote triage with Blue Scope is conducted by remotely connecting and 
performing a series commands on an endpoint system. These commands construct a 
picture of the internal operations of each system being interrogated.   
4. RETRI 
Former Mandiant employees Aaron LeMasters and Michael Murphy gave a 
presentation titled RETRI: Rapid Enterprise Triaging at Black Hat. It detailed the 
capabilities and implementation of their Codeword tool [11].   Although similar to the 
Mandiant Intelligent Response, Codeword uses Microsoft Software Installers (MSI) to 
deploy what they term agents for remote triage purposes. These agents are software 
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packages that monitor the computer’s status and permit remote access on each of the 
computers. They also enable the remote execution of forensic tools across a network’s 
devices [12].   
The main distinguishing feature of the RETRI concept though, is its network 
design. It requires the presence of two fully functional networks: one for production and 
one for quarantine. Once a system is compromised it is moved from the production to the 
quarantine network. This process requires a large initial investment of time and resources. 
However, it reduces the time to recover and restore operations after a compromise. In a 
virtualized network, such as the one built for this capstone, this could be implemented 
with fewer resources, further reducing the recovery time. Figure 3 shows the proposed 
network setup from their Black Hat brief for the RETRI concept. 
 
Figure 3.  RETRI network topology, from [11] 
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III. LAB ENVIRONMENT  
The RETRI network design provides an interesting strategy for the accelerated 
recovery of assets from an incident. We employed this network design in our scenario 
environment to demonstrate this recovery capability after the initial identification of a 
compromise using our toolset. This chapter describes the sandbox environment we 
created for our testing purposes. The environment for this lab exercise is completely 
virtualized, which provides a simplified means to utilize the mirrored VLAN response 
and recovery strategy proposed in the RETRI brief. All of the client machines, servers, 
routers, and switches are run within the ESXi server environment. The network was 
designed to emulate Navy networks and supports a variety of operating systems and 
versions. There are four virtual machines used to provide the routing and switching 
infrastructure for the entire network. There are also four networks, 3 Active Directory 
domains and 1 Linux network utilizing Samba.   
Each production domain also has a mirrored domain to support the expedited 
recovery. The mirrored domain is identical to the production domain. The only difference 
between the production domain and the mirror domain is that they reside on different 
VLANs. After creation, the computers in the mirrored domains are powered off until they 
are needed in the recovery process. With the discovery of a compromise, machines can be 
powered on and moved from the mirrored domain to the production domain, quickly 
restoring basic functionality. Upon completion of installation and setup, the general 
topology of the network is illustrated in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  General network topology 
A. DOMAIN ALPHA.ACO 
The first production domain is alpha.aco. The alpha.aco domain was designed to 
simulate some of the most up-to-date networks in the DOD and DON. For it, we used a 
combination of Windows Server 2012 Standard Edition and Windows 7 operating 
systems. There are a total of ten machines in the domain: four servers and six 
workstations. Table 1 provides a listing of all of the machines, their role in the network 
and their IP address. 
Table 1. Alpha.aco machine names, roles, and IP addresses 
 
Virtual Machine Name Role IP Address 








AlphaEX01 Mail Server 10.1.0.23 
AlphaWWW1 Web Server 10.1.0.24 
AlphaWS01 Workstation 10.1.0.25 
AlphaWS02 Workstation 10.1.0.26 
AlphaWS03 Workstation 10.1.0.27 
AlphaWS04 Workstation 10.1.0.28 
AlphaWS05 Workstation 10.1.0.29 




In vSphere, each of the four servers in the alpha.aco domain is provisioned with 
40GB HD space, 4GB of Random Access Memory (RAM) and one Network Interface 
Card (NIC). This exceeds the Microsoft recommended values of 32GB HD and 512 MB 
RAM, and was intended to improve performance in the virtualized environment. All of 
the server NIC’s for this domain reside in the Alpha VLAN in the vSphere software. 
ALPHADC01 is the first domain controller, primary Domain Name Service (DNS) 
server, and Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server for the domain. Within 
DHCP, all of the machines on the network have Internet Protocol (IP) address 
reservations. This ensures that computers on the production domain have the same 
addressing as computers on the mirror domain. ALPHAFS01 is the primary file share 
server for the domain with the Network File System (NFS) feature installed. 
ALPHAEX01 is the mail server for the domain. It uses Microsoft Exchange 2013 as the 
mail server software. The final server in the domain is ALPHAWWW1, a web server 
running Microsoft IIS 8. For security these machines are completely patched and 
updated.   
(2) Workstations 
For the Windows 7 workstations each virtual machine was provisioned with 
20GB HD space, 2GB of RAM and one NIC. All of the NICs for these workstations 
reside on the ALPHA VLAN as defined in the vSphere software. Though the machines 
will retain the same IP address, they are still configured for DHCP, to support ease of 
installation on the client side. Their individual reservations on the DHCP server ensure 
that their addresses will not change. These machines were left unpatched with automatic 
updates turned off. We did this in order to simulate new vulnerabilities on systems 
without the use of zero-day attacks, which is beyond the scope of our project.   
B. DOMAIN BRAVO.ACO 
The second domain in our enterprise network is the bravo.aco domain. The 
bravo.aco domain has general similarities to many of the Navy shore station networks. In 
it we deployed the Microsoft Windows Server 2008 Standard Edition and Microsoft 
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Windows 7 operating systems. There are a total of ten computers in the bravo.aco 
domain; 4 servers and six workstations. Table 2 provides a list of the machine names, 
roles, and IP addresses. 
Table 2. Bravo.aco machine names, roles and IP addresses 
 
Virtual Machine Name Role IP Address 








BravoEX01 Mail Server 10.2.0.23 
BravoWWW1 Web Server 10.2.0.24 
BravoWS01 Workstation 10.2.0.25 
BravoWS02 Workstation 10.2.0.26 
BravoWS03 Workstation 10.2.0.27 
BravoWS04 Workstation 10.2.0.28 
BravoWS05 Workstation 10.2.0.29 
BravoWS06 Workstation 10.2.0.30 
 
(1) Servers 
In vSphere, each of the four servers in the bravo.aco domain is provisioned with 
30GB HD space, 4GB of RAM and one NIC. This exceeds the Microsoft minimum 
values of 10GB HD and 512 MB RAM, and is intended to help improve the performance 
in the virtualized environment. All of the server NIC’s for this domain reside in the Bravo 
VLAN. BRAVODC01 is the first domain controller, primary DNS server, and DHCP 
server for the domain. Within DHCP, all of the machines on the network have specific IP 
addresses reserved. This is to ensure that computers on the production domain have the 
same addressing as their counterparts on the mirror domain. BRAVOFS01 is the primary 
file share server for the domain with the NFS feature installed. It is also a domain 
controller and secondary DNS server for the domain. BRAVOEX01 is the mail server for 
the domain. It uses Microsoft Exchange Server 2010 as the mail server software. The 
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final server in the domain is BRAVOWWW1, a web server running Microsoft IIS 7. For 
security reasons these machine are completely patched and updated.   
(2) Workstations 
The workstations in the bravo.aco domain are using the Windows 7 Operating 
System (OS) and are configured in the same manner as those listed in the alpha.aco 
domain. 
C. DOMAIN CHARLIE.ACO 
The third domain in our enterprise network is the charlie.aco domain. The 
charlie.aco domain emulates the majority of Integrated Shipboard Network Services 
(ISNS) environments using the Microsoft Windows Server 2003 and Microsoft Windows 
XP operating systems. These are older systems in which much of the software has 
reached the end of its life cycle, thus creating security challenges for system 
administrators and Information Assurance Managers (IAM). Table 3 provides a list of 
computers in the charlie.aco domain with machine names, roles, and IP addresses. 
Table 3. Charlie.aco machine names, roles, and IP addresses 
 
Virtual Machine Name Role IP Address 








CharlieEX01 Mail Server 10.3.0.23 
CharlieWWW1 Web Server 10.3.0.24 
CharlieWS01 Workstation 10.3.0.25 
CharlieWS02 Workstation 10.3.0.26 
CharlieWS03 Workstation 10.3.0.27 
CharlieWS04 Workstation 10.3.0.28 
CharlieWS05 Workstation 10.3.0.29 
CharlieWS06 Workstation 10.3.0.30 
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(1) Servers 
In vSphere, each of the four Windows 2003 servers in the charlie.aco domain is 
provisioned with 20GB HD space, 2GB of RAM and one NIC. This exceeds the 
Microsoft minimum values of 2GB HD and 128 MB RAM, and is intended to help 
improve the performance in the virtualized environment. All of the server NICs for this 
domain reside in the CHARLIE VLAN in the vSphere software. We used the same 
procedures for DHCP that we used in the other domains to ensure clients maintain the 
same IP address. CHARLIEEX01 is the mail server for the domain. It uses Microsoft 
Exchange Server 2007 as the mail server software. The final server in the domain is 
CHARLIEWWW1. It has Microsoft IIS 6 installed to provide the web server capability. 
For security and functionality reasons these machine are completely patched and updated.   
(2) Workstations 
For the six Windows XP workstations in the charlie.aco domain each virtual 
machine was provisioned with 20GB HD space, 2GB of RAM and one NIC. All of the 
NIC’s for these workstations reside on the CHARLIE VLAN in the vSphere software. 
Though the machines will retain the same IP address, they are still configured for DHCP 
to support ease of installation on the client side. Their individual reservation on the 
DHCP server ensures that their address will not change. These machines were left 
unpatched with automatic updates turned off.   
D. DOMAIN DELTA.ACO 
The fourth and final domain in our enterprise network is the delta.aco domain. 
This domain represents non-standard system found throughout the DOD Global 
Information Grid (GIG). These machines use the Ubuntu distribution of the Linux 
operating system, as it has many similarities to the HP-UX and Solaris OSs used in 
certain DON systems, but allows us to avoid licensing costs. Table 4 provides a list of 
computers in the delta.aco domain with machine names, roles, and IP addresses. 
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Table 4. Delta.aco machine names, roles, and IP addresses 
 
Virtual Machine Name Role IP Address 








DeltaEX01 Mail Server 10.4.0.23 
DeltaWWW1 Web Server 10.4.0.24 
DeltaWS01 Workstation 10.4.0.25 
DeltaWS02 Workstation 10.4.0.26 
DeltaWS03 Workstation 10.4.0.27 
DeltaWS04 Workstation 10.4.0.28 
DeltaWS05 Workstation 10.4.0.29 
DeltaWS06 Workstation 10.4.0.30 
 
(1) Servers 
There are a total of four servers in the delta.aco domain. Each uses Ubuntu 12.04 
with GUI mode for the operating system. To provide directory services that can be used 
with the Windows system, the server used as a domain controller in delta.aco, 
DELTADC01, has Samba installed. The email services are provided to the domain with 
Sendmail 8.14.9 mail server software. The web server uses Apache 2.4 to provide a 
public facing website. DNS was implemented on the servers DELTADC01 and 
DELTAFS01 by installing and configuring the Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) 
software package. A DHCP server was installed on DELTADC01. We did this by 
downloading and installing the DHCP software package and then making the necessary 
changes to the dhcp.conf file.   
(2) Workstations 
There are six workstations in the delta.aco domain. All of the workstations use 
Ubuntu 12.04 as their operating system. Each of the workstations was provisioned with 
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20GB of hard disk space and 2GB of RAM. The workstations in the production domain 
are part of the vSphere defined DELTA VLAN in the ESX environment, while the 
workstations in the mirror domain are part of the vSphere defined DELTA MIRROR 
VLAN. All of the workstations are configured for DHCP but each has a specific 
reservation on the DHCP server to ensure they will always have the same IP address and 
to allow the full functionality of the system to continue uninterrupted if it is moved to the 
mirror domain.   
E. INFRASTRUCTURE 
An integral part of this lab environment is the routing and switching 
infrastructure. Rather than using the built-in capabilities for routing and VLAN switching 
available in vSphere we used another approach which required more software and 
configuration but allowed for more granular control and is more similar to a real world 
enterprise environment. To do this, we initially installed and configured four Virtual 
Machines (VM) with Windows XP. Then we installed the Graphic Network Simulator 
version 3 (GNS3) software package on each machine to provide routing and switching 
support.   
GNS3 is a suite of software that includes: Dynamips, VirtualBox, and Qemu. It is 
an open source software project developed to allow for the virtualization of large-scale 
routing environments. Its initial purpose was to prepare students for portions of the Cisco 
Certified Internetworking Expert (CCIE) and Juniper Networks Certified Internet Expert 
(JNCIE) exams without incurring the cost of acquiring the necessary hardware. Now it is 
also used as a sandbox environment for testing changes to routing features prior to their 
implementation in production environments. For our lab scenario we primarily used the 
Dynamips software to support the virtualization of a Cisco Internetworking Operating 
System (IOS) device on a Personal Computer (PC). Currently GNS3 does not support the 
virtualization of Cisco Catalyst switches due to the nature of the ASIC processors found 
in those devices [13]. 
However, we were unable to achieve full functionality using the GNS3 software. 
To connect the router simulated on a computer to outside devices requires the use of a 
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bridged loopback adapter. This works well when there is only one device connected to 
the router. However, when trying to connect the router to multiple machines in a vSphere 
VLAN the connectivity was intermittent. We contacted the software developers who 
informed us that it was not intended to be used in such a way and could not offer support 
for improving the functionality. Our alternative was to use a DD-WRT implementation 
for our routing and switching. DD-WRT is open source firmware for Linksys routers that 
allows for more control on typical plug and play routers. The following sections describe 
our implementation of the DD-WRT infrastructure. 
1. VM 
For simplicity of operation and configuration, the VM’s to be used for the basis of 
the routing and switching devices were installed as x86 DD-WRT. This variety of DD-
WRT software is a Linux-based operating system that can function on standard PC’s 
instead of just Linksys routers. We used the 24461 release, retrievable online from the 
DD-WRT website [14]. The machines are configured with 10GB of HD, 1GB of RAM, 
and 3 NICs. The procedures we used configuring and installing the DD-WRT operating 
system are found in Appendix A. 
2. Routing 
To further demonstrate the enterprise-level design of the lab environment, we 
used local routers for each domain and a core router providing interconnectivity. To 
support the edge routing for each production domain and its corresponding mirrored 
domain, we installed and configured four routers with three NIC’s each, one Wide Area 
Network (WAN) interface and two Local Area Network (LAN) interfaces. A fifth router 
was installed and configured for the core routing in between the routers for each domain 
with two NIC’s, one WAN and one LAN. The routers are configured to use Routing 
Information Protocol (RIP) version 2. Table 5 shows each of the routers, the host VM on 
which they reside, IP address, subnet mask, and to what they are connected. The 
procedures for configuring the routers are found in Appendix A. 
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Table 5. Router connectivity 
 
Host VM Router Name IP Addresses Subnet Mask Connection  
Point 






































Switching in the lab environment is accomplished by adding the configuration of 
VLANs within the DD-WRT interface. This is necessary in order for the environment to 
be able to utilize 802.1Q.  802.1Q is the IEEE standard for tagging traffic for a particular 
VLAN on a trunk through the addition of 32 bit tag to the Ethernet header between the 
source address and type/length fields. Inside the tag are four fields: TPID, Priority, CFI, 
and VID [15]. For our purposes the most important of these fields is the VID as it 
correctly identifies the VLAN for which the traffic is destined. This enables us to have 
each domain completely mirrored, including machine names and IP addresses while 
maintaining the ability to segregate the traffic between the production domain and the 
mirror domain. 
Also to support the switching environment, each production and mirror domain 
was given its own VLAN in the vSphere software configuration. Table 6 illustrates the 
breakout of VLANs by the routers, their label in vSphere, their programmed VLAN 
number, and which portion of the network they service. The procedures for installing and 
configuring the network switching are found in Appendix A. 
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Table 6. Switching breakout 
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IV. FORENSIC TOOLSET 
The tools we examined in Chapter II represent some of the best capabilities 
currently available for computer triage. Software of this nature is not installed on Navy 
networks due to program of record policies. However, many of the tools used in 
specialized computer network security suites have originated from a native tool delivered 
with the operating system.   Navy networks do have these Windows native OS tools and 
the Sysinternals suite. In developing our toolkit we wanted to focus on using software 
allowed on government networks and available to DOD administrators and analysts. 
These tools can be leveraged to provide a remote triage capability for administrators and 
analysts on afloat networks. In this chapter we examine the individual pieces of our 
forensic toolkit. To do so, the individual tools must be assembled into a centralized 
location, and precautions must be taken to ensure the integrity of the tools themselves. 
Finally, a method for the deployment of the tools in an automated and efficient manner is 
presented. 
A. EXAMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL TOOLS 
1. Native Tools 
The native operating system tools we chose each provide a small piece of 
information; when used together they can provide information on the status of a system 
as a whole. Table 7 provides a list of the native tools chosen and the information that they 
can provide. Specific information that could be an IOC for each tool is provided in the 
analysis section of Chapter 6. 




Displays or sets the system date. date /t   : Displays the current 
date without prompting for a new date [16] 
time.exe 
 
Displays or sets the system time. time /t   : Displays the current 
system time, without prompting for a new time [17] 
ipconfig.exe Displays the current Transmission Control Protocol/Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP) configuration [18] 
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net.exe 




     net use  
 
 
     net share 
  
 
     net start 
   
  
Manages server computer connections. Used without 
parameters, net session displays information about all sessions 
with the local computer [19] 
 
Used without parameters, net use retrieves a list of network 
connections [20] 
  
Used without parameters, net share displays information about all 
of the resources that are shared on the local computer [21] 
 
Used without parameters, net start displays a list of services that 
are currently operating [22] 
sc.exe query Obtains and displays information about the specified service, 
driver, type of service, or type of driver [23] 
driverquery.exe Displays a list of all installed device drivers and their properties 
[24] 
tasklist.exe Displays a list of applications and services with their Process ID 
(PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer 
[25]. Appendix B provides common processes running in the lab 
environment and their purposes. 
netstat.exe 
 
Displays active TCP connections, ports on which the computer is 
listening, Ethernet statistics, the IP routing table, IPv4 statistics 
(for the IP, ICMP, TCP, and UDP protocols), and IPv6 statistics 
(for the IPv6, ICMPv6, TCP over IPv6, and UDP over IPv6 





Nbtstat is designed to help troubleshoot NetBIOS name 
resolution problems. When a network is functioning normally, 
NetBIOS over TCP/IP (NetBT) resolves NetBIOS names to IP 
addresses. The nbtstat command removes and corrects preloaded 
entries using a number of case-sensitive switches. The nbtstat -
 a < name > command performs a NetBIOS adapter status 
command on the computer name specified by < name>. The 
adapter status command returns the local NetBIOS name table for 
that computer as well as the MAC address of the adapter card. 
The nbtstat -A <IP address > command performs the same 




     <KeyName> 
Returns a list of the next tier of subkeys and entries that are 
located under a specified subkey in the registry. 
 
Specifies the full path of the subkey. For specifying remote 
computers, include the computer name (in the format 
\\ComputerName\) as part of the KeyName. Omitting 
\\ComputerName\ causes the operation to default to the local 
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computer. The KeyName must include a valid root key. Valid root 
keys for the local computer are: HKLM, HKCU, HKCR, HKU, 
and HKCC. If a remote computer is specified, valid root keys are: 
HKLM and HKU [28] 
doskey.exe 
 
recalls a history of commands entered via the current command 
prompt session, edits command lines, and creates macros [29] 
 
2. Sysinternals Suite Tools 
The native operating system tools provide general information on the status of a 
system. However, for a more in-depth view of possible security issues, we chose to use 
some of the tools from the Microsoft Sysinternals suite. These tools provide additional 
information about the state of a system not available from the native tools. Table 8 
contains a list of the Sysinternals tools we chose and the information they provide. 
Table 8. Sysinternals tools and their capabilities 
psexec.exe Psexec.exe enables to the execution of programs on remote 
systems.   It encrypts all communication between local and 
remote systems. [30] 
psservice.exe PsService is a service viewer and controller for Windows. Like 
the sc utility included in the Windows NT and Windows 2000 
Resource Kits, PsService displays the status, configuration, and 
dependencies of a service, and allows starting, stopping, pausing, 
resuming and restarting them. Unlike the SC utility, 
PsService enables users to logon to a remote system using a 
different account from the one currently they are currently using. 
This is useful for cases when the account does not have required 
permissions on the remote system.  PsService includes a unique 
service-search capability, which identifies active instances of a 
service on a network. [31] 
psloggedon.exe
  
Displays locally and remotely logged on users. When specifying 
a user name instead of a computer, PsLoggedOn searches the 
computers in the domain and displays if the user is currently 
logged on [32] 
logonsessions.exe Lists the currently active logon sessions and the -p option 
displays the processes running in each session [33] 





Handle is targeted at searching for open file references, so 
without command-line parameters it will list the values of all the 






Shows the currently configured auto-start applications as well as 
the full list of Registry and file system locations available for 




ListDLLs is a utility that reports the DLLs loaded into processes. 
ListDLLs can also display full version information for DLLs, 
including their digital signature, and can scan processes for 
unsigned DLLs [37] 
sigcheck.exe Sigcheck is a utility that aids in verification of file integrity. It 
can be used to hash files with several algorithms, verify file 
certificate chains, and search for non-signed files in sensitive 
directories [38]. 
 
B. BUILDING THE TOOLKIT 
Once we decided upon the list of tools and their intended purposes we created a 
new virtual machine to serve as our triage workstation for the enterprise network. For this 
we installed the Microsoft Windows 7 Professional operating system. This was a fully 
patched and updated system to give higher assurance to the data and software maintained 
on this machine. We began by gathering the specified tools in a folder named tools on the 
C: drive. The Sysinternals tools were downloaded from the Microsoft website, and the 
individual tools were placed in this folder. For the native tools, we initially copied them 
from the c:\windows\system32 directory. However, when attempting to run these tools 
from c:\tools, they did not work. The software would run, but it provided no output. After 
some research we discovered that Microsoft uses Multilingual User Interface (MUI) files 
to store resources for many of the commands in the System32 directory, such as ipconfig, 
netstat, nbtstat, and tasklist [39]. In order for the executable files to function properly, we 
needed these resource files to be copied to our toolset location. To do this we used the 
xcopy command with the –s argument to copy subdirectory files as well as the 
executable. Figure 5 shows the exact command line syntax and the results. This was then 
repeated for all of the necessary tools in the System32 directory. 
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Figure 5.  Command to copy .exe and .mui files 
Once we found all of the software and placed it in our tools folder we began to 
test each tool in the different operating system environments to ensure we were getting 
the expected outputs as described by the tables above. The tools functioned as expected 
on all of the Windows 7 clients in the enterprise and on the Windows Server 2012 
machines. However, when we ran the tools on the Windows XP clients, the Server 2008 
machines and the Server 2003 machines we noticed some issues in their output. Many of 
the System32 tools from a Windows 7 machine would not function in these environments 
generating errors stating that the programs were not valid Win32 executable files even 
though they were retrieved from the 32 bit version of the OS. To address this issue we 
copied the needed executable files from each version of Windows and then created tool 
folders for each of the operating systems. 
1. Tool Integrity 
With our toolset assembled, the next step was to ensure their fidelity. Since the 
tools were collected from newly installed machines in a closed environment we were 
reasonably sure that the files had not been compromised. However, there is no guarantee 
that the files would remain untouched. Microsoft does not provide the hash values for 
their tools. Instead, they state that if the software is downloaded from their site, it is 
authentic [40]. So, we took hashes of each of the files. To do so we used the sigcheck 
utility in the Sysinternals suite, which provides a Secure Hashing Algortihm-1 (SHA-1), 
SHA-256, and Message Digest-5 (MD5) hash values [38].    We then stored these hash 
values in a separate location on an ISO image to prevent tampering. Prior to using the 
tools, sigcheck should be run on the tools directory, and the hash values should be 
compared to known good values. If there are any differences, it is possible the tools have 
been compromised and their outputs can no longer be trusted. If a compromise to the 
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triage machine is suspected, the sigcheck utility may report no issues when in fact there 
are. In this case, the hard disk for the triage machine would need to be mounted and 
examined on a new machine, and the hashes calculated from software on the new 
machine. Table 9 provides the hash values for the different algorithms output from the 
sigcheck utility. 



































































































2. Tool Deployment 
With the toolset assembled, and a means for verifying its integrity in place, we 
next focused on a method for employing the tools in an automated manner. The integral 
part of making this work was the Sysinternals tool psexec. This tool allows for remote 
connections to computers in a Windows environment as well as the remote execution of 
programs. Incorporating this tool we constructed two batch files. The first batch file, 
which we named connect.bat, remotely connects to all of the computers in the domain 
using psexec and then copies the second batch file to those computers and executes it. 
The second batch file, which we named toolscript.bat, reaches back to the triage machine 
and executes the tools from it; it then redirects all of the output from the tools to a 
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separate file for each machine in the results folder on the triage machine. The contents of 
the two batch files can be found in Appendix C. 
We then ran our toolset across the entire enterprise. The results obtained served as 
our baseline. After the insertion of malware into the network, which is explained in the 
next chapter, we ran the toolset again. We then analyzed the two results sets for 































V. MALWARE IMPLEMENTATION 
With the scenario environment built, and the toolkit developed, the next step was 
to test the toolkit. In order to test the efficacy of the toolkit in identifying and classifying 
compromises in a network, we had to create a compromise. To do this we infected one of 
the machines with malware. When trying to determine the right malware to use in this 
project we had several objectives in mind. First we wanted to use a well-developed 
software package. We did not want to have to troubleshoot unknown issues while trying 
to deploy it. Next, we wanted to implement software that had an intuitive user interface 
not requiring an in-depth knowledge of the code in order to use it. Finally, we wanted to 
use malware that has been used in notable attacks and has actual pertinence to present 
day computer security. With these objectives in mind, we chose the Remote Access Tool 
(RAT), Poison Ivy. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Poison Ivy is a backdoor program that has been actively recognized on the 
Internet since 2005. Poison Ivy has been at the root of many notable corporate network 
compromises. The most recognized being the attack on RSA that compromised a large 
number of their SecureID tokens in 2011. Attackers have also notably used Poison Ivy in 
concerted attacks against chemical makers, government agencies, defense contractors, 
and human rights groups [41]. The tool itself is not very sophisticated, but it does provide 
a persistent and often well hidden connection to compromised machines inside a network. 
This gives attackers the ability to perform more sophisticated attacks from within the 
target network. 
B. CAPABILITIES 
The list below from Trend Micro’s analysis of Poison Ivy details many of its 
capabilities [43].   
Capture screen, audio, and webcam 
List active ports 
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Log keystrokes 
Manage open windows 
Manage passwords 
Manage registry, processes, services, devices, and installed applications 
Perform multiple simultaneous transfers of files 
Remote shell access 
Relay server 
Search files 
Update, restart, and terminate itself 
 
Many of these capabilities are well-suited for a program used in the exfiltration of 
data in cyber-espionage attacks. However, some of the capabilities lend themselves to 
more sophisticated attacks. First is the ability to manage passwords. This lets the 
attackers potentially escalate their privilege level on the now compromised network, 
gaining access to new areas and more information. Also, there is the remote shell 
capability. With this, an attacker can use Poison Ivy to deliver an even more nefarious 
payload targeting other devices and services in the network. Even though Poison Ivy may 
lack the refinement of current malware it still has the capability to wreak havoc upon a 
network. 
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
The nomenclature surrounding Poison Ivy can be somewhat misleading. It 
consists of two components, a client and a server; however, the client is software on the 
machine that the attacker is using, while the server is the software that is embedded in the 
target network. It communicates between the client and server using a custom protocol 
over TCP. It can be configured to use any port number but the default in the application is 
port 3460. It uses the Camelia cipher with a 256 bit key for encryption and Microsoft’s 
LZNT1 algorithm for compression [42]. For the attacker, the command and control 
 32 
software provides a very intuitive graphical user interface, which provides point and click 
access to all of the aforementioned capabilities.  
D. CLIENT INFECTION 
The primary way Poison Ivy infects new machines is from downloads on 
malicious websites. The file size for the tool is less than 10 kilobytes (kB) before the 
addition of any wrappers or obfuscation [42]. Once executed, the file copies itself to a 
location predefined by the attacker and inserts registry entries for persistence. Next, 
Poison Ivy injects itself into the process of the default browser for the machine, further 
hiding its operations from discovery. It does this by starting the browser process with the 
–nohome argument which starts the process but does not open a Window for the browser. 
Finally, it can use Alternate Data Streams (ADS), an obscure component of the New 
Technology File System (NTFS), to hide itself within other files [44].    A normal 
directory listing will not display the ADS the dir –R command or a tool like Sysinternal’s 
sigcheck must be used. Figure 6 gives an example of this. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Hiding files in alternate data streams 
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E. IMPLEMENTATION 
To insert Poison Ivy in our lab environment we installed a new virtual machine 
with the Kali Linux operating system. Kali is a distribution dedicated to penetration 
testing with over 300 tools for testing network security [45]. We placed this machine 
outside of the enterprise network in the 192.168.0.0/24 network. It has a manually 
configured IP address of 192.168.0.10. Once the Kali machine was fully installed we then 
downloaded and installed Poison Ivy. Instructions for the installation and configuration of 
Poison Ivy can be found in Appendix D. We followed these instructions to create the 
client interface on our Kali machine, and to create the server.exe file which served as the 
RAT infecting a machine on the enterprise network.    Finally, we started the Apache web 
server service on the Kali machine to serve as our vector of attack. An unsuspecting user 
that was logged into the ALPHAWS01 workstation browsed to the http://192.168.0.10/
share website and clicked the link. This executed the server.exe file on the ALPHAWS01 
machine, installing Poison Ivy and providing administrative access to this machine from 
the Kali machine. This not only allowed the attacker on the Kali machine access to the 
ALPHAWS01 machine, but to all of the resources available on the alpha.aco domain as 








VI. ANALYSIS AND RECOVERY 
At this point in the project a computer on the network had been compromised by 
Poison Ivy. We had two sets of outputs from our developed native toolset: one to serve as 
the baseline for known good operations and the other from a compromised machine. This 
chapter presents the analysis of these two outputs for the purpose of discovering 
indicators of compromise. These IOCs are specific to Poison Ivy. Had we used another 
form of malware, we would have discovered different indicators of compromise. We 
examined the output of each tool and described possible IOCs they could provide. 
Outputs that did provide evidence of a compromise are shown in this chapter. The other 
outputs that did not are presented in Appendix F. 
Once we analyzed the outputs and determined that we had a compromise on the 
system the focus shifted to recovery. The second section of this chapter focuses on this. It 
describes the actions that were taken to recover network functionality through the use of 
the mirrored VLAN. It then covers some of the other capabilities use off the mirrored 
VLAN facilitated.  
A. TOOL OUTPUT ANALYSIS 
The following section provides the analysis of each tool’s output in the order in 
which they were run from the batch file. 
1. Executables 
The psloggedon command output displays the users that are logged onto the 
system. As a remote triage tool, it can indicate unauthorized access if it displays users 
that should not be on the system. In our analysis there were no discrepancies in the output 
from the two scans. Similar to psloggedon, logonsessions provides the usernames of all 
users logged onto a system. In addition, it also displays their logon type, the 
authentication mechanism used, and the processes that are running in the session. 
Unexplained logons and even legitimate logons that are usually not active during the time 
of the survey are typical indications of compromise.   Suspect and unknown processes in 
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this output are also considered possible IOCs. Moreover, the output from logonsessions 
can be used in conjunction with the output from other tools such as handle to further 
investigate suspicious activity. If a process listed in handle’s output is running for a user 
that has no entry in logonsessions it warrants further investigation.  “Backdoors and 
Trojans such as the infamous SubSeven allow users to log in to the Trojan via a raw 
Transmission Control Protocol connection, bypassing the windows authentication 
mechanisms,” and not creating an entry in logonsessions [46, p. 19]. Table 10 provides a 
comparison of the logonsessions output from the baseline and the compromised machine. 
In the infected machine’s output, process id 3652 iexplore.exe appears to be a legitimate 
process running in the administrator’s session. This process is later revealed to be 
malicious; however, at this stage it had not been identified as an indicator of compromise. 
In the tables that follow in this chapter, yellow highlighted items are discovered IOCs and 
blue highlighted items are compromised processes that were not evident from the tool 
output. 
Table 10. Output of the logonsessions –p command 
 
Baseline Output Infected Output 
Logonsesions v1.21 
Copyright (C) 2004–2010 Bryce Cogswell and 
Mark Russinovich 
Sysinternals - wwww.sysinternals.com 
 
 
 [6] Logon session 00000000:001f429b: 
    User name:    ALPHA\Administrator 
    Auth package: Kerberos 
    Logon type:   Interactive 
    Session:      1 
    Sid:          S-1-5-21-3079887268-
1858392370-3246419219-500 
    Logon time:   8/18/2014 3:56:56 PM 
    Logon server: ALPHADC01 
    DNS Domain:   ALPHA.ACO 
    UPN:          Administrator@alpha.aco 
      868: taskhost.exe 
     1296: dwm.exe 
     1504: explorer.exe 
     1540: cmd.exe 
     1108: conhost.exe 
      
Logonsesions v1.21 
Copyright (C) 2004–2010 Bryce Cogswell and Mark 
Russinovich 
Sysinternals - wwww.sysinternals.com 
 
 
 [5] Logon session 00000000:0001a854: 
    User name:    ALPHA\Administrator 
    Auth package: Kerberos 
    Logon type:   Interactive 
    Session:      1 
    Sid:          S-1-5-21-3079887268-1858392370-
3246419219-500 
    Logon time:   8/22/2014 12:38:25 PM 
    Logon server: ALPHADC01 
    DNS Domain:   ALPHA.ACO 
    UPN:          Administrator@alpha.aco 
     1416: taskhost.exe 
     1672: dwm.exe 
     1816: explorer.exe 
     3652: iexplore.exe 
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The next tool run in the survey was net session. The net session command can 
display the usernames of accounts that are remotely accessing the system. It also displays 
the client type from which they are connecting and any shared resources, such as drives, 
they are connected to on this system. Observing unauthorized users or multiple instances 
of the same account logged on both locally and remotely to a system could also be an 
IOC. The analysis we performed on these outputs presented no IOCs. 
Tasklist outputs a list of running processes, the process identification, session 
name, number, and the memory usage. The analyst’s familiarity with processes should 
allow for rogue or unknown processes to register as being unfamiliar. Unfamiliar 
processes can be researched on repository sites such ProcessLibrary.com and 
TaskList.org. In addition, Appendix B of this document contains many of the common 
processes in Windows operating systems and their functions within the OS. An 
investigator will always want to know what processes are running on a potentially 
compromised system, as they could provide correlation of compromises on multiple 
systems. Additional switches such as “tasklist /SVC” show service name to process 
relationship and “tasklist /M” shows the dynamic linked libraries (DLL) associated with 
the process [46, pp. 23–26]. The infected host output contains malicious iexplore.exe PID 
3652; however, at this stage of the survey, it appears normal and not an IOC.  
The next tool, pslist –t, enhances the output from tasklist. It displays parent and 
child process relationships in a tree format. The analyst should be familiar with the order 
in which processes are started during system startup and use the displayed CPU time and 
elapsed time to provide insight into the process’s correct elapsed time with respect to 
when the process starts during system startup. For instance, system startup processes such 
as lsass.exe, csrss.exe, smss.exe should be in the beginning of the list, not children of the 
explorer process. Processes with odd child parent relationships should be investigated as 
a potential IOC [46, pp. 23–26]. Table 11 shows the normal baseline output and infected 
output which contains the malicious process id 3652, iexplore, which is not flagged as an 
IOC at this stage of the survey. 
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Table 11. Output of pslist –t command 
 
Baseline Output Infected Output 
Process information for ALPHAWS01: 
 
Name                             Pid Pri Thd  Hnd      VM      WS    Priv 
Idle                               0   0   1    0       0      24       0 
  System                           4   8  87  466    2560    1032      48 
    smss                         252  11   2   29    4048     532     220 
csrss                            336  13   9  337   35304    2520    1164 
  conhost                       1188   8   2   35   21684    2204     552 
wininit                          384  13   3   74   34208    2564     872 
  services                       480   9   6  196   31880    4960    3508 
    sppsvc                       312   8   4  146   30136    5568    2012 
    svchost                      600   8   9  334   36724    5004    2396 
    svchost                      680   8   7  222   27176    4348    2256 
    svchost                      804   8  18  437   53500    8948    8368 
    svchost                      840   8  14  375   95924   26984   28728 
      dwm                       1296   8   3   69   41156    3072    1000 
    taskhost                     868   8   8  160   44396    5044    2432 
    svchost                      880   8  29  924   98568   12124   13448 
    svchost                      988   8  13  351   51040    7080    4900 
    svchost                     1084   8  17  485   73056   10756   13460 
    spoolsv                     1172   8  12  263   59328    5180    4160 
    svchost                     1208   8  18  303   40348    6424    7544 
    svchost                     1332   8   9  150   36864    4768    3212 
    SearchIndexer               1428   8  14  676  107304   11684   26068 
    svchost                     1752   8   5   96   26680    2920    1108 
    svchost                     1872   8   8  302   47480    3672    2052 
    PSEXESVC                    3172   8   9  116   40508    4140    1624 
      cmd                       2040   8   1   32   21200    2572    1832 
        pslist                  2872  13   1  138   41436    4100    1572 
  lsass                          488   9   9  655   34804    7024    3296 
  lsm                            496   8   9  135   14392    2284    1044 
csrss                            396  13   8  178   37244    3964    1228 
  conhost                       1108   8   2   51   47608    3968     908 
winlogon                         436  13   3  108   40500    3224    1564 
explorer                        1504   8  18  656  176400   29100   16252 
  cmd                           1540   8   1   22   31528    2144    1732 
  iexplore                      3788   8  12  390  136968   19524    7728 
    iexplore                    3872   8  14  352  113496   18160    5144 
Process information for ALPHAWS01: 
 
Name                             Pid Pri Thd  Hnd      VM      WS    Priv 
Idle                               0   0   1    0       0      24       0 
  System                           4   8  81  496    2176     636      44 
    smss                         252  11   2   29    4048     536     216 
csrss                            336  13   8  350   35112    2556    1132 
  conhost                       3960   8   2   33   21620    2208     548 
wininit                          384  13   3   72   34208    2884     944 
  services                       480   9   6  189   28836    5164    3344 
    svchost                      604   8   9  336   35868    5420    2516 
      WmiPrvSE                  2884   8   6  109   27888    4472    1732 
    svchost                      668   8   7  218   27176    4396    2044 
    svchost                      716   8  18  440   53500    9460    8404 
    svchost                      840   8  16  387   97168   32140   27944 
      dwm                       1672   8   3   68   41156    3644    1000 
    svchost                      880   8  33  922   93572   19852   12772 
    SearchIndexer                972   8  12  634   82964    8528   15344 
    svchost                      988   8  16  386   52744    8188    4840 
    svchost                     1080   8  16  374   59832    9064   10960 
    spoolsv                     1172   8  12  264   59328    7692    4164 
    svchost                     1208   8  18  299   45628    6464    7876 
    svchost                     1332   8  12  208   38024    5136    3272 
    taskhost                    1416   8   8  156   44396    5324    2452 
    svchost                     1756   8   5   94   26680    3468    1104 
    wmpnetwk                    1976   8   9  219   77904    2472    3244 
    svchost                     1984   8   9  310   47736    5156    2072 
    sppsvc                      2036   8   4  146   30136    6760    1936 
    PSEXESVC                    3852   8   9  114   40508    4292    1720 
      cmd                       3952   8   1   30   22224    2744    1980 
  lsass                          492   9   7  627   34292    7532    2900 
  lsm                            500   8  10  136   14648    2480    1088 
csrss                            396  13   8  318   37116    4424    1276 
  conhost                       3556   8   2   53   47672    3980     880 
winlogon                         436  13   3  108   40500    3932    1420 
explorer                        1816   8  26  821  224480   45420   33296 
  iexplore                      3652   8   4  109   54984    4368    1772 
  cmd                           3964   8   1   24   28904    2448    1852 
    pslist                      4076  13   1  130   53212    4104    1608 
 
Listdlls is useful for verifying known processes and gleaning information on 
unknown or rogue processes. The observation of the command line arguments, process, 
process id, Dynamic Linked Library (DLL) and path of the DLL can provide strong 
evidence of abnormal behavior. In the output below the highlighted entry is an indicator 
of compromise. There are half as many DLLs being called by process 3652 vice process 
3872 of iexeplorer.exe. This is unusual and further investigation reveals the –nohome 
switch. This allows iexplore.exe to run in the background without opening a browser 
page. This process is actually Poison Ivy which has injected itself into iexplorer.exe. This 
IOC would still be visible if time stamp modification or executable renaming obfuscation 
techniques were in use. Table 12 displays the outputs of this command. 
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Table 12. Output of listdlls command 
 
Baseline Output Infected Output 
ListDLLs v3.1 - List loaded DLLs 
Copyright (C) 1997–2011 Mark Russinovich 
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
iexplore.exe pid: 3872 
Command line: “C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\
iexplore.exe” SCODEF:3788 CREDAT:14337 
 
Base        Size      Path 
0x008d0000  0xa6000  C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\
iexplore.exe 
0x77680000  0x13c000  C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll 
0x77140000  0xd4000   C:\Windows\system32\kernel32.dll 
0x75850000  0x4a000   C:\Windows\system32\
KERNELBASE.dll 
0x77220000  0xa0000 C:\Windows\system32\ADVAPI32.dll 
0x77060000  0xac000   C:\Windows\system32\msvcrt.dll 
0x75df0000  0x19000   C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\sechost.dll 
0x75bd0000  0xa1000   C:\Windows\system32\RPCRT4.dll 
0x773b0000  0xc9000   C:\Windows\system32\USER32.dll 
0x76dc0000  0x4e000   C:\Windows\system32\GDI32.dll 
0x76bb0000  0xa000    C:\Windows\system32\LPK.dll 
0x75c80000  0x9d000   C:\Windows\system32\USP10.dll 
0x77000000  0x57000   C:\Windows\system32\SHLWAPI.dll 
0x75e20000  0xc49000  C:\Windows\system32\SHELL32.dll 
0x76bc0000  0x15c000  C:\Windows\system32\ole32.dll 
0x77480000  0x1f9000  C:\Windows\system32\iertutil.dll 
0x76a70000  0x135000  C:\Windows\system32\urlmon.dll 
0x772c0000  0x8f000 C:\Windows\system32\OLEAUT32.dll 
0x758c0000  0x11c000  C:\Windows\system32\CRYPT32.dll 
0x75840000  0xc000    C:\Windows\system32\MSASN1.dll 
0x76d20000  0x1f000   C:\Windows\system32\IMM32.DLL 
0x75d20000  0xcc000   C:\Windows\system32\MSCTF.dll 
0x6ed80000  0xa7c000 C:\Windows\system32\IEFRAME.dll 
0x77810000  0x5000    C:\Windows\system32\PSAPI.DLL 
0x6ed40000  0x3c000   C:\Windows\system32\OLEACC.dll 




0x76d40000  0x7b000   C:\Windows\system32\comdlg32.dll 
0x6e290000  0x35000   C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\
IEShims.dll 
0x75720000  0xc000    C:\Windows\system32\CRYPTBASE.dll 
0x74820000  0x40000   C:\Windows\system32\uxtheme.dll 
0x757c0000  0xe000    C:\Windows\system32\RpcRtRemote.dll 
0x743f0000  0x13000   C:\Windows\system32\dwmapi.dll 
0x77820000  0x83000   C:\Windows\system32\CLBCatQ.DLL 
0x74410000  0xf5000   C:\Windows\system32\propsys.dll 
0x757d0000  0xb000    C:\Windows\system32\profapi.dll 
0x76e60000  0x19d000 C:\Windows\system32\SETUPAPI.dll 
0x75aa0000  0x27000   C:\Windows\system32\CFGMGR32.dll 
0x758a0000  0x12000   C:\Windows\system32\DEVOBJ.dll 
0x75250000  0x16000   C:\Windows\system32\CRYPTSP.dll 
0x74ff0000  0x3b000   C:\Windows\system32\rsaenh.dll 
0x6e3b0000  0x2b000   C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\
ieproxy.dll 
0x75ad0000  0xf4000   C:\Windows\system32\WININET.dll 
0x75e10000  0x3000    C:\Windows\system32\Normaliz.dll 
0x756b0000  0x1a000   C:\Windows\system32\SspiCli.dll 
0x777d0000  0x35000   C:\Windows\system32\ws2_32.DLL 
0x777c0000  0x6000    C:\Windows\system32\NSI.dll 
ListDLLs v3.1 - List loaded DLLs 
Copyright (C) 1997–2011 Mark Russinovich 




iexplore.exe pid: 3652 
Command line: “C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\
iexplore.exe” -nohome 
 
Base        Size      Path 
0x01310000  0xa6000   C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\
iexplore.exe 
0x77a10000  0x13c000  C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll 
0x77760000  0xd4000   C:\Windows\system32\kernel32.dll 
0x75be0000  0x4a000   C:\Windows\system32\
KERNELBASE.dll 
0x76360000  0xa0000   C:\Windows\system32\
ADVAPI32.dll 
0x76400000  0xac000   C:\Windows\system32\msvcrt.dll 
0x760b0000  0x19000   C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\sechost.dll 
0x774c0000  0xa1000   C:\Windows\system32\RPCRT4.dll 
0x77b70000  0xc9000   C:\Windows\system32\USER32.dll 
0x779c0000  0x4e000   C:\Windows\system32\GDI32.dll 
0x77b50000  0xa000    C:\Windows\system32\LPK.dll 
0x75e60000  0x9d000   C:\Windows\system32\USP10.dll 
0x77670000  0x57000   C:\Windows\system32\
SHLWAPI.dll 
0x76670000  0xc49000  C:\Windows\system32\SHELL32.dll 
0x77860000  0x15c000  C:\Windows\system32\ole32.dll 
0x772c0000  0x1f9000  C:\Windows\system32\iertutil.dll 
0x76530000  0x135000  C:\Windows\system32\urlmon.dll 
0x75f10000  0x8f000   C:\Windows\system32\
OLEAUT32.dll 
0x75d40000  0x11c000  C:\Windows\system32\
CRYPT32.dll 
0x75bd0000  0xc000    C:\Windows\system32\MSASN1.dll 
0x77840000  0x1f000   C:\Windows\system32\IMM32.DLL 
0x75fe0000  0xcc000   C:\Windows\system32\MSCTF.dll 
0x75fa0000  0x35000   C:\Windows\system32\ws2_32.DLL 
0x77b60000  0x6000    C:\Windows\system32\NSI.dll 
0x75610000  0x3c000   C:\Windows\system32\mswsock.dll 
0x750e0000  0x5000    C:\Windows\System32\wshtcpip.dll 
0x74ee0000  0x12000   C:\Windows\system32\mpr.dll 
0x6fa20000  0x13000   C:\Windows\system32\avicap32.dll 
0x74f00000  0x32000   C:\Windows\system32\WINMM.dll 
0x75050000  0x9000    C:\Windows\system32\VERSION.dll 
0x6f9f0000  0x21000   C:\Windows\system32\MSVFW32.dll 




0x6fdb0000  0xd000    C:\Windows\system32\pstorec.dll 
0x73ef0000  0x14000   C:\Windows\system32\ATL.DLL 
0x73e30000  0x1c000   C:\Windows\system32\iphlpapi.dll 
0x73e20000  0x7000    C:\Windows\system32\WINNSI.DLL 
0x75a40000  0x1a000   C:\Windows\system32\SspiCli.dll 
0x74790000  0x39000   C:\Windows\system32\
MMDevAPI.DLL 
0x74690000  0xf5000   C:\Windows\system32\PROPSYS.dll 
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0x750d0000  0x44000   C:\Windows\system32\dnsapi.DLL 
0x73aa0000  0x1c000   C:\Windows\system32\iphlpapi.DLL 
0x73a90000  0x7000    C:\Windows\system32\WINNSI.DLL 
0x756d0000  0x4b000   C:\Windows\system32\apphelp.dll 
0x736f0000  0x21000   C:\Windows\system32\ntmarta.dll 
0x76e10000  0x45000   C:\Windows\system32\WLDAP32.dll 
0x74cc0000  0x9000    C:\Windows\system32\VERSION.dll 
0x74070000  0x52000   C:\Windows\system32\RASAPI32.dll 
0x74050000  0x15000   C:\Windows\system32\rasman.dll 
0x74040000  0xd000    C:\Windows\system32\rtutils.dll 
0x702f0000  0x6000    C:\Windows\system32\sensapi.dll 
0x75210000  0x3c000   C:\Windows\system32\mswsock.dll 
0x74d50000  0x5000    C:\Windows\System32\wshtcpip.dll 
0x73c20000  0x10000   C:\Windows\system32\NLAapi.dll 
0x73580000  0x6000    C:\Windows\system32\rasadhlp.dll 
0x6e2e0000  0x2e000   C:\Windows\system32\MLANG.dll 
0x73070000  0x8000    C:\Windows\System32\winrnr.dll 
0x73060000  0x10000   C:\Windows\system32\napinsp.dll 
0x73020000  0x12000   C:\Windows\system32\pnrpnsp.dll 
0x75200000  0x6000    C:\Windows\System32\wship6.dll 
0x73930000  0x38000   C:\Windows\System32\fwpuclnt.dll 
0x75730000  0x5f000   C:\Windows\system32\SXS.DLL 
0x6d5e0000  0x5b2000  C:\Windows\System32\mshtml.dll 
0x70640000  0x2a000   C:\Windows\System32\msls31.dll 
0x6e260000  0x30000   C:\Windows\System32\iepeers.dll 
0x71d30000  0x51000   C:\Windows\System32\
WINSPOOL.DRV 
0x702d0000  0xb000    C:\Windows\system32\msimtf.dll 
0x6e1a0000  0xb2000   C:\Windows\System32\jscript.dll 
0x702c0000  0xb000    C:\Windows\system32\ImgUtil.dll 
0x70280000  0xe000    C:\Windows\System32\pngfilt.dll 
0x702e0000  0x5000    C:\Windows\system32\msimg32.dll 
0x73e10000  0x32000   C:\Windows\system32\WINMM.dll 
0x74510000  0x39000   C:\Windows\system32\
MMDevAPI.DLL 
 
The handle command outputs all running processes and their relative executable 
path.   This enables the analyst to determine the file path location(s) of a process in 
addition to its active file descriptors. When an unknown process is running, handle can be 
used to provide an analyst with further clues about its origin and behaviors. In the 
handle.exe output below there is a difference between the standard operation of 
iexplore.exe in a clean machine and the Poison Ivy usage of iexplore.exe in a tainted 
machine. The iexplorer.exe process in the infected output was started by the server.exe 
file in the system 32 directory. Which is atypical since the iexeplorer.exe file resides in 
the “Program Files” directory. Table 13 presents the outputs of this command. 
 
 
Table 13. Output of handle command 
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Baseline Output Infected Output 
Handle v3.51 
Copyright (C) 1997–2013 Mark Russinovich 
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com  
 
iexplore.exe pid: 3872 ALPHA\administrator 
    8: File  (RW-)   C:\Users\administrator\Desktop 
   38: File  (R-D)   C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\en-
US\iexplore.exe.mui 




   D0: Section       \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Internet 
Explorer Immutable Application State (00000ECC-0000-
0000-0000-000000000000) 
   EC: Section       \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\
windows_shell_global_counters 




  110: Section       \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\
ie_lcie_main_ecc 
  114: Section       \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Isolation 
Process Registry (427E9554-2732-11E4-8C8C-
0050569C73C3) 
  118: Section       \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Isolation 
Signal Registry (427E9554-2732-11E4-8C8C-
0050569C73C3, 0) 
  18C: Section       
\BaseNamedObjects\__ComCatalogCache__ 
  194: Section       
\BaseNamedObjects\__ComCatalogCache__ 
  1A0: Section       \BaseNamedObjects\
windows_shell_global_counters 
  1B8: Section       \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\
IEFrame!GetAsyncKeyStateSharedMem!3788 
  204: Section       \BaseNamedObjects\
C:*ProgramData*Microsoft*Windows*Caches*cversions.2
.ro 
  220: Section       \BaseNamedObjects\
C:*ProgramData*Microsoft*Windows*Caches*cversions.2
.ro 
  224: Section       \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\
windows_shell_global_counters 






Copyright (C) 1997–2013 Mark Russinovich 
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com 
 
iexplore.exe pid: 3652 ALPHA\administrator 
    8: File  (RW-)   C:\Windows\System32 
   38: File  (R-D)   C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\en-US\
iexplore.exe.mui 




   BC: File  (R-D)   C:\Windows\System32\en-US\msvfw32.dll.mui 
   C0: File  (R-D)   C:\Windows\System32\en-US\avicap32.dll.mui 




  360: File  (---)   C:\Windows\System32\server.exe 
 
 
The ipconfig command outputs network configuration information critical to 
identifying the system under investigation. Any changes to the IP or MAC addresses of 
the computer should be investigated further as a potential IOC. Special attention must be 
paid to computers with dual NICs. Systems with dual NICs are high value targets as they 
allow an attacker to pivot from compromised network enclaves into deeper out of band 
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enclaves of the enterprise network. There were no discrepancies between the outputs we 
analyzed. 
Following in the networking aspects of the system, the next tool in the survey was 
netstat. The netstat –an command provides the active network connections on the system. 
Being familiar with the listening ports and their associated services on a baseline machine 
allows an analyst to notice suspect network connections. Also depending on the purpose 
of the system, established connections should be looked for. In the table below, the 
highlighted entry on port 3460 is an indicator of Poison Ivy. Table 14 compares the 
baseline and infected outputs of this command. 
Table 14. Output of netstat –an command 
 
Baseline Output Infected Output 
Active Connections 
 
  Proto  Local Address          Foreign Address        State 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:135            0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:445            0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:5357           0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:49152          0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:49153          0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:49154          0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:49172          0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:49173          0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:49184          0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    10.1.0.25:139          0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    10.1.0.25:445          10.1.0.2:56817         
ESTABLISHED 
  TCP    10.1.0.25:51273        10.1.0.2:445           
ESTABLISHED 
  TCP    10.1.0.25:51277        10.1.0.2:445           
ESTABLISHED 
  TCP    [::]:135               [::]:0                 LISTENING 
  TCP    [::]:445               [::]:0                 LISTENING 
  TCP    [::]:5357              [::]:0                 LISTENING 
  TCP    [::]:49152             [::]:0                 LISTENING 
  TCP    [::]:49153             [::]:0                 LISTENING 
  TCP    [::]:49154             [::]:0                 LISTENING 
  TCP    [::]:49172             [::]:0                 LISTENING 
  TCP    [::]:49173             [::]:0                 LISTENING 
  TCP    [::]:49184             [::]:0                 LISTENING 
New connections will not be remembered. 
 
There are no entries in the list. 
Active Connections 
 
  Proto  Local Address          Foreign Address        State 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:135            0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:445            0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:5357           0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:49152          0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:49153          0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:49154          0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:49155          0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:49156          0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    0.0.0.0:49157          0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    10.1.0.25:139          0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING 
  TCP    10.1.0.25:445          10.1.0.2:57947         
ESTABLISHED 
  TCP    10.1.0.25:49185        192.168.1.10:3460      
ESTABLISHED 
  TCP    10.1.0.25:49503        10.1.0.2:445           
ESTABLISHED 
  TCP    10.1.0.25:49511        10.1.0.2:445           
ESTABLISHED 
  TCP    [::]:135               [::]:0                 LISTENING 
  TCP    [::]:445               [::]:0                 LISTENING 
  TCP    [::]:5357              [::]:0                 LISTENING 
  TCP    [::]:49152             [::]:0                 LISTENING 
  TCP    [::]:49153             [::]:0                 LISTENING 
  TCP    [::]:49154             [::]:0                 LISTENING 
  TCP    [::]:49155             [::]:0                 LISTENING 
  TCP    [::]:49156             [::]:0                 LISTENING 
  TCP    [::]:49157             [::]:0                 LISTENING 
New connections will not be remembered. 
 
There are no entries in the list. 
 
Observing the connection to an unknown or suspect port should be followed up 
by running netstat –anob. This displays the relationship between the executable, the 
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process identifier, and the associated established network connection. [46, p. 31] It 
appears the iexplore.exe PID 3652 has established a connection on port 3460. Usually 
iexplore.exe is a legitimate binary; however, an established connection to a port other 
than 80 or 443 is abnormal. In this instance Poison Ivy used process injection to establish 
an outbound connection. Table 15 shows the output of the netstat -anob command with 
the iexplorer.exe program as the owner of the connection. A seasoned intruder could 
change this to port 443 making this appear like encrypted web traffic and making it more 
difficult to identify the activity as an IOC. Referencing the output of netstat -anob against 
those from handle and listdlls can help when examining browser sessions that appear to 
be legitimate usage. 




  Proto   Local Address Foreign Address State            PID 
  TCP     0.0.0.0:135         0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING        668 RpcSs [svchost.exe] 
  TCP     0.0.0.0:445    0.0.0.0:0   LISTENING        4 Can not obtain ownership 
information 
  TCP     0.0.0.0:5357      0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING        4  Can not obtain ownership 
information 
  TCP     0.0.0.0:49152    0.0.0.0:0   LISTENING        384 [wininit.exe] 
  TCP     0.0.0.0:49153     0.0.0.0:0   LISTENING        716 eventlog  [svchost.exe] 
  TCP     0.0.0.0:49154     0.0.0.0:0    LISTENING        880 Schedule  [svchost.exe] 
  TCP     0.0.0.0:49155   0.0.0.0:0   LISTENING    480 [services.exe] 
  TCP     0.0.0.0:49156  0.0.0.0:0   LISTENING        1756 PolicyAgent  [svchost.exe] 
  TCP     0.0.0.0:49157 0.0.0.0:0       LISTENING       492 [lsass.exe] 
  TCP     10.1.0.25:135  10.1.0.50:49229 ESTABLISHED     668   RpcSs  [svchost.exe] 
  TCP     10.1.0.25:139          0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING        4 Can not obtain ownership 
information 
  TCP    10.1.0.25:445          10.1.0.50:49225    ESTABLISHED    4 Can not obtain ownership 
information 
  TCP     10.1.0.25:49155      10.1.0.50:49230     ESTABLISHED     480 [services.exe] 
  TCP     10.1.0.25:49185    192.168.1.10:3460  ESTABLISHED     3652 [iexplore.exe] 
  TCP     10.1.0.25:49809      10.1.0.50:445         ESTABLISHED     4 Can not obtain ownership 
information 
  TCP     [::]:135                [::]:0                  LISTENING        668 RpcSs [svchost.exe] 
  TCP     [::]:445                [::]:0                  LISTENING        4 Can not obtain ownership 
information 
  TCP     [::]:5357               [::]:0                  LISTENING        4  Can not obtain ownership 
information 
  TCP     [::]:49152              [::]:0                  LISTENING        384 [wininit.exe]  
  TCP     [::]:49153              [::]:0                  LISTENING        716 eventlog  [svchost.exe] 
  TCP     [::]:49154              [::]:0                  LISTENING        880 Schedule  [svchost.exe] 
  TCP     [::]:49155              [::]:0                  LISTENING        480 [services.exe] 
  TCP     [::]:49156              [::]:0                  LISTENING        1756 PolicyAgent [svchost.exe] 
  TCP     [::]:49157              [::]:0                  LISTENING        492 [lsass.exe] 
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The net use command shows the mapped drives in use by a system. Unknown or 
unfamiliar mapped drives should be investigated immediately for unauthorized activity 
and potential IOC. If there are other IOCs the machines that contain the mapped drives 
should be investigated. The net share command shows drives shared remotely along with 
all mapped drives in use. Unknown or unfamiliar shared and mapped drives should be 
investigated immediately for unauthorized activity. We did not have any drives mapped 
within our network, so neither of these commands yielded any output relevant for 
investigating a compromise. 
The next command in the survey examines connectivity with respect to the 
NetBIOS protocol. The nbtstat –nrs command displays current NetBIOS cache 
information pertaining to remote machines from recent sessions. The type code identifies 
the purpose of the remote operating system within a network. Unusual recent sessions 
could lead to an IOC. NetBIOS type <20> is a file server service most likely associated 
with a recently established connection over port 445 [47]. Nbtstat is also used by 
attackers to enumerate vulnerable targets within a network. In the event that an IOC is 
found on a surveyed system, the output of nbtstat could reveal other compromised 
systems within the network [46, p. 20]. However, our survey of the infected machine 
produced no IOCs. 
The next group of commands in the survey all focused on the services running on 
the computer. The net start command outputs a list of running services. Unknown, 
unfamiliar or recently launched services should be investigated as a potential IOC. The sc 
query command is a powerful tool similar to net start. It also allows for the ability to 
modify and display service configuration information. Particular information of interest is 
a service’s running state; “NOT_STOPPABLE” could be a method of persistence used by 
malware. Unknown or unfamiliar services should be investigated as a potential IOC. The 
psservice command outputs information similar to sc query; however, the added 
“DISPLAY_NAME” field provides the description and purpose of the service. Services 
with no write up, incorrect English, or inapplicable information should be investigated as 
a potential IOC. As Poison Ivy uses process injection and ADS to hide itself rather than 
manipulating running services, no IOCs were found in the outputs of these commands. 
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The next command run in the toolset is very useful when investigating a suspect 
process or service identified by tasklist, pslist, net start, or sc query. Autorunsc displays a 
list of currently configured auto-start applications and services. The output from 
autorunsc is beneficial because methods of persistence can be identified; if the autorunsc 
output of a system differs from its baseline and is not from an approved software 
installation or upgrade, this is a likely symptom of malware infection [46, pp. 44–45]. In 
our environment, this tool revealed no IOCs. 
2. Registry Keys 
The next group of tools examines settings within the Windows registry. The 
registry is a database of all of the settings and options within the Windows operating 
systems. It contains a large amount of data within a large number of keys and sub keys. 
Because of the registry’s complexity it is often used by attackers as a way to hide their 
attacks and maintain persistence. Microsoft’s Technet website is an invaluable resource 
when investigating suspicious entries within the registry. These tools focus on some of 
the most common registry keys that are used by attackers. We queried the registry for 
each key listed in the following paragraphs. None of them produced any IOCs, however, 
we provided the types of information that could present an IOC in each key. 
The “FileRenameOperations” registry key can expose possible obfuscation 
techniques. This registry key keeps track of all file rename operations on a system. Any 
entries in this registry key should be investigated as they could be a possible IOC. In this 
scenario Poison Ivy used default install methods with no file rename operations for 
obfuscation. Had the RAT performed a file rename operation the registry key above 
would be populated with the original and new file names along with the time of the 
change. There is a sub key called “PendingFileRenameOperations.”  This key lists any 
files to be renamed at the next system restart. This could be an IOC as well. If the 
malware cannot rename a file due to it being used by the operating system or a program,  
it will remain in this key until the next reboot. Since no files on the system had been 
renamed there was no output for this command. 
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The “Environment” registry key contains the path folder locations and path 
extension specifics. This is the default location from which certain executables are run by 
a user. Irregular system paths and path extensions can be indicative of obfuscation and 
persistence techniques. An example would be when unknown executable types are 
intentionally specified to execute within a shell from a set path. There are a large number 
of sub-keys in this listing, making determination of a compromise difficult. Questionable 
sub-keys and settings can be compared to Microsoft’s recognized environmental variable 
settings on the Technet site. 
The “Hivelist” registry key contains a listing of the top level registry keys that are 
not recreated each time the system starts. These include the HKLM security, software and 
system hives. Any keys outside of these could be attempts at persistence by malware and 
should be investigated as a possible IOC. The output from the compromised machine 
contained no IOC and has been validated as normal on Microsoft’s development network 
[48]. 
The “CrashControl” registry key contains the path and file name for crashdump 
information. It also contains the settings for what actions Windows takes when a system 
crashes to include what information if any is written into the “crashdump” file. The 
“crashdump” file could also be used as a data exfiltration tactic in conjunction with a 
man-in-the-middle since the file contents are transmitted to Microsoft once connected to 
the Internet. Any sub keys that specify data locations outside of kernel and memory 
dumps should be treated as a possible IOC.   
The “Winlogon” registry key’s location differs among versions of Windows. This 
registry key, along with its sub-keys governs all facets of access to a Windows system. 
The names of the registry sub-keys should match with the DLL files in the System32/
config directory. If they do not match DLL files in that directory it is possibly an IOC. 
This registry key can also be used for a few methods of malware persistence, such as the 
shell and userinit sub keys being replaced with malicious executables versus the genuine 
explore.exe or userinit.exe.  
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3. Metadata 
Analysis of the Windows NTFS metadata can assist in discovering IOCs. It can 
also assist in building a timeline of events as the occurred during the compromise. This in 
turn can be used to aid in forensic analysis within this system and possibly on additional 
systems within the network. Figure 7 illustrates the file system operations that will update 
the timestamps stored as NTFS metadata. There are four date and time stamps in the 
$STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute [49, p. 317]. Our focus for this project is on 
three of them. The file creation (C), modification (W), and access (A) times can indicate 
when a file has been introduced to the system or when a file was last altered.  
 
 
Figure 7.  File times and operations that update them, from [52] 
The c:\windows\system32 directory contains many of the executables and DLLs 
associated with the Windows operating system. The files and folders contained within it 
should not typically be written to. Any entries with unusual timestamps should be 
examined as potential IOC. Table 16 presents the outputs of these commands from the 
baseline and infected scan. The highlighted entries represent an IOC that has not been 






Table 16. File times for c:\windows\sytem32 
 
Baseline Output Infected Output 
Directory of C:\windows\system32 
 
06/10/2009  02:13 PM         3,698,584 ieapfltr.dat 
08/18/2014  04:16 AM    <DIR>          drivers 
08/19/2014  12:10 AM    <DIR>          config 
08/22/2014  10:07 AM             9,792 7B296FB0-376B-
497e-B012-9C450E1B7327-5P-1.C7483456-A289-
439d-8115-601632D005A0 
08/22/2014  10:07 AM             9,792 7B296FB0-376B-
497e-B012-9C450E1B7327-5P-0.C7483456-A289-
439d-8115-601632D005A0 
            2721 File(s)    971,004,466 bytes 
              89 Dir(s)  13,544,857,600 bytes free 
 Volume in drive C has no label. 
 Volume Serial Number is B64D-6289 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
------- 
Directory of C:\windows\system32 
 
06/10/2009  02:13 PM           445,952 ieapfltr.dll 
08/14/2014  04:48 AM          3,412 ALPHAWS01-
2014-08-2014-Time- 
08/15/2014  12:09 PM    <DIR>          . 
08/15/2014  12:09 PM    <DIR>          .. 
08/18/2014  04:16 AM    <DIR>          drivers 
08/19/2014  12:10 AM    <DIR>          config 
            2721 File(s)    971,004,466 bytes 
              89 Dir(s)  13,544,857,600 bytes free 
 Volume in drive C has no label. 
 Volume Serial Number is B64D-6289 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
------- 
Directory of C:\windows\system32 
 
06/10/2009  02:13 PM           445,952 ieapfltr.dll 
 
08/14/2014  04:48 AM          3,412 ALPHAWS01-
2014-08-2014-Time- 
            2721 File(s)    971,004,466 bytes 
              89 Dir(s)  13,544,857,600 bytes free 
 Volume in drive C has no label. 
 Volume Serial Number is B64D-6289 
 
Directory of C:\windows\system32 
 
06/10/2009  02:13 PM         3,698,584 ieapfltr.dat 
08/14/2014  04:48 AM         3,412 ALPHAWS01-
2014-08-2014-Time- 
08/19/2014  12:10 AM    <DIR>          config 
08/22/2014  12:40 PM           103,496 perfc009.dat 
08/22/2014  12:40 PM           615,122 perfh009.dat 
08/22/2014  12:40 PM           713,888 
PerfStringBackup.INI 
08/22/2014  01:27 PM    <DIR>          .. 
08/22/2014  01:27 PM    <DIR>          . 
08/22/2014  01:27 PM             9,216 server.exe 
08/22/2014  01:33 PM    <DIR>          drivers 
08/23/2014  12:38 PM             9,792 7B296FB0-
376B-497e-B012-9C450E1B7327-5P-0.C7483456-
A289-439d-8115-601632D005A0 
08/23/2014  12:38 PM             9,792 7B296FB0-
376B-497e-B012-9C450E1B7327-5P-1.C7483456-
A289-439d-8115-601632D005A0 
            2722 File(s)    971,013,682 bytes 
              89 Dir(s)  13,539,770,368 bytes free 
 Volume in drive C has no label. 




Directory of C:\windows\system32 
 
06/10/2009  02:13 PM           445,952 ieapfltr.dll 
<...content removed for write up...> 
08/14/2014  04:48 AM             3,412 ALPHAWS01-
2014-08-2014-Time- 
08/19/2014  12:10 AM    <DIR>          config 
08/22/2014  01:27 PM             9,216 server.exe 
08/22/2014  01:27 PM    <DIR>          .. 
08/22/2014  01:27 PM    <DIR>          . 
08/22/2014  01:33 PM    <DIR>          drivers 
            2722 File(s)    971,013,682 bytes 
              89 Dir(s)  13,539,770,368 bytes free 
 Volume in drive C has no label. 




Directory of C:\windows\system32 
 
06/10/2009  02:13 PM           445,952 ieapfltr.dll 
<...content removed for write up...> 
08/14/2014  04:48 AM             3,412 ALPHAWS01-
2014-08-2014-Time- 
08/22/2014  01:27 PM             9,216 server.exe 
            2722 File(s)    971,013,682 bytes 
              89 Dir(s)  13,539,770,368 bytes free 
 Volume in drive C has no label. 
 Volume Serial Number is B64D-6289 Volume Serial 
Number is DE5C-61AC 
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B. RESPONSE AND RECOVERY 
Upon completion of the analysis of the toolkit’s output we determined that we had 
enough indications that the ALPHAWS01 had been compromised. After this 
determination was made, we took two initial actions. The first was on the production 
domain ALPHAWS01 computer. We moved it from the ALPHA VLAN to the ALPHA 
MIRROR VLAN. Then in the vSphere software we renamed the virtual machine to 
COMPROMISED_ALPHAWS01 to distinguish it as an infected machine. Next, we 
powered on the ALPHAWS01 machine in the mirror domain and moved it from the 
ALPHA MIRROR VLAN to the ALPHA VLAN.   
The compromised machine was now homed in the mirror domain and no longer 
had access to any of the machines or resources in the production domain. Conversely, the 
mirror domain machine was now in the production domain. The mirrored domain 
machine is a copy of the machine that was created directly after installation and 
configuration. This means that all of the domain membership and access information 
carries over and the addition was seamless, without risk of continued compromise. At this 
point the system administrator still had access to the compromised machine in isolation. 
This serves two purposes.   
First it allows the administrator to further investigate the machine. Additional 
information could indicate further compromise of the machine. The machine can be kept 
as it is indefinitely if a more detailed investigation is required. In a physical network this 
would mean a loss of the machine until an investigation was closed. However, with this 
implementation, there is no impact to the operation of the network. Also, this allows the 
system administrator to retrieve any critical data stored on the compromised machine in a 
controlled manner. Further investigation can indicate when the initial compromise 
occurred. This date can be used as a reference for restoring data from backups. Finally, 
when a compromise on a network has been determined, the possibility exists for other 
elements of the network to be compromised as well. Confirmation of malware on one 
machine requires a scan using the toolset across the entire enterprise. Any compromised 
machines would then be moved to the mirrored VLAN, with their counterpart moved to 
the production VLAN. With the compromised machine discovered and the initial triage 
 49 
performed, steps must then be taken remediate the conditions that allowed for the 








In this capstone project we created a toolset for the identification and 
classification of computer security compromises. In order to facilitate its use by Navy 
network administrators, it contains only programs native to Windows operating systems 
and the Sysinternals suite, which are already present on Navy networks. We then 
demonstrated the capability of this toolset to detect malware inserted into a computer in 
the network. With the compromise determined, we then examined how the use of 
mirrored VLANs and domains can facilitate an accelerated recovery from an incident. 
The incorporation of a native toolset and mirrored VLANS could provide Navy network 
administrators with an improved strategy for identifying, classifying, and recovering from 
compromises. 
(2) Future work 
There are further areas of development that could increase the usefulness of this 
project. The scenario presented here provides an excellent opportunity for adoption into 
coursework in the areas of forensics and incident response. The nature of this scenario 
would lend itself well to the examination of the toolset outputs for academic purposes in 
a lab exercise. 
If we were to continue with this project the next phase would involve the Linux 
network we developed. An initial toolset for detecting compromises in a Linux network 
was developed but we were unable to test its efficacy due to time constraints. The list of 
these tools is available in Appendix E. Malware would need to be inserted into the Linux 
network, and the output from these tools would need to be examined to determine if they 
would provide reliable indicators of the compromise. 
Finally, this project could be expanded through the use of other forms of malware 
and the investigation of other potential tools that could be included in the toolset. The use 
of other types of malware could be used to confirm the capability of these tools to 
provide an accurate status of a computer’s security. As more malware is analyzed using 
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this toolset, a database of discovered IOCs could be created as a reference for use with 
the toolset. At the same time, the toolset we have created is not a static object. More 
research could prove that there are other tools available that would provide increased 





































APPENDIX A. INSTALLING AND CONFIGURING DD-WRT 
ROUTING AND SWITCHING 
A. INSTALLING THE IMAGE 
1. On a fully functional Windows 7 machine within the vSphere environment 
browse to ftp://ftp.dd-wrt.com/others/eko/BrainSlayer-V24-preSP2/2014/
06-23-2014-r24461/x86/ 
2. From here download the file dd-wrt_public_vga.image 
3. Next, point the browser to http://m0n0.ch/wall/physdiskwrite.php 
4. Download physdiskwrite 0.5.3 
5. Shutdown the Windows 7 machine. 
6. In the vSphere client software select FileNewVirtual Machine 
7. Select the custom radio button 
8. Name the machine 
9. Select the appropriate storage location 
10. Leave the default machine version 
11. Select the Linux radio button, from the drop down menu select Other 
Linux 2.6 32-bit 
12. Leave defaults for processors and RAM, these can be lowered if necessary 
due to limited resources 
13. Select 2 NICs, both configured as E1000, the first NIC will be the WAN, 
the second will be the LAN 
14. Leave the SCSI settings at the default 
15. On the next page select do not create disk at this time 
16. Select the check box to edit machine settings before completion and click 
continue 
17. Click the Add button on the Virtual Machine properties window 
18. Select hard disk, click next 
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19. Click next 
20. Set disk size to 1 GB and click next 
21. Select the radio button for IDE 0 : 0, click next 
22. Click finish twice 
23. Right click on the Windows 7 virtual machine that you downloaded the 
image and software to and select edit settings 
24. Click add 
25. Select hard disk and click next 
26. Select use and existing virtual disk and click next 
27. Browse the data store for the hard disk for the virtual machine just created, 
click ok, the click next through the rest of the prompts 
28. Power on the Windows 7 virtual machine 
29. Run physdiskwrite as an administrator 
30. Right click on the new IDE hard drive, select “image laden” and “offlen” 
(the application is written in German) 
31. Browse to the DD-WRT image. Select all file types at the bottom. 
32. Select the image file and click open 
33. Click ok and the click yes on the dialog boxes. 
34. Click ok. The image is now on the virtual IDE drive. 
35. Power off the Windows 7 machine. 
36. In the vSphere software, right click on the Windows 7 virtual machine and 
select edit settings 
37. Select the IDE virtual hard disk and click remove 
38. Click ok 
39. Power on the DD-WRT machine and begin the process of configuring the 
routing and switching. 
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B. CONFIGURING ROUTING AND SWITCHING 
The default IP address for the LAN side NIC on a DD-WRT router is 192.168.1.1. 
All of the configurations are done via the web interface. To access this, log onto the 
Windows 7 virtual machine. Ensure the machine is configured for DHCP and that it is in 
the same vSphere VLAN as the second NIC on the DD-WRT machine. 
 
1. Log into the Windows 7 virtual machine 
2. Browse to 192.168.1.1 
3. Set the user name and password 
4. Set the WAN IP for manual configuration and fill in the router name and 
WAN IP address 
5. Set the LAN IP, gateway and DNS 
6. Save the settings 
7. Click on the Networking link. 
8. Add two VLANs in the VLAN subsection 







































APPENDIX B. WINDOWS PROCESSES 
In this appendix we present some of the more common processes in the various 
Windows operating system environments. Many of the tools we used examined processes 
for potential IOCs. Recognizing the common Windows processes and their basic function 
aided in the analysis phase. 
A. XP 
Figure 8 below is a screen capture of the tasklist output from one of the Windows 
XP machines in our network. It shows many of the common processes for this OS. Table 
16 then provides the functions of these processes. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Typical Windows XP process list 
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The alg.exe (application layer gateway) allows applications 
(such as IM clients, RTSP, BitTorrent, SIP, and FTP) from a 
client computer to dynamically utilize passive TCP/ UDP 
ports in communicating with known ports on a server. This 
allows software to access applications that reside on another 
computer even if there is a firewall.  
The alg.exe file’s absence would cause the security protocols 
to block communication ports, or for network administrators 
to consciously open numerous ports on the firewall that would 




Enables execute of a batch file. An executable that provides 
the command prompt (MS-DOS shell interpreter) for 




Needed to boot to Windows. Used to maintain the Win32 






The explorer.exe (located in the C:\WINDOWS folder), 
manages the Windows Graphical Shell including the Start 
Menu, Taskbar, Desktop, and File Manager. Without it 
running, the graphical interface for Windows will disappear. 




(LSA Security Service) - Needed to boot to Windows. The 
Local Security Authority server process. lsass .exe is a Lite 
belonging to Event Agent Setup from Event Agent 





System Idle Process is not a process, more a counter which is 
displayed in WinTasks used for measuring how much idle 
time the CPU is having at any particular time. This counter 
will display how much CPU Resources, as a percentage are 
‘idle’ and available for use. 
System 
 
Non-system processes like [system process] originate from 








(Windows NT Session Manager) - Needed to boot to 
Windows. Used to establish the Windows XP environment 
during boot up. 
smss.exe is a process which is a part of the Microsoft 
Windows Operating System. It is called the Session Manager 







Services and Controller app) - Needed to boot to Windows. 
Main Service file for Plug and Play. Services.exe is a part of 
the Microsoft Windows Operating System and manages the 
operation of starting and stopping services. This process also 
deals with the automatic starting of services during the 
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(Generic Host Process for Win32 Services) - Needed to boot 
to Windows. 
The file svchost.exe is the Generic Host Process for Win32 
Services used for administering 16-bit-based dynamically 







The spoolsv.exe file is described as the Spooler SubSystem 
App or Windows Print Spooler Service and is the main 
component of the printing interfaces. The spoolsv.exe file is 
initialized when the computer starts, and it runs in the 




tasklist.exe displays a list of applications and services with 
their Process ID (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or 
a remote computer. 






The VMware Tools service (vmtoolsd.exe on Windows guests 
or vmtoolsd on Linux and Solaris guests). This service 
synchronizes the time in the guest operating system with the 
time in the host operating system. On Windows guests, it also 
controls grabbing and releasing the mouse cursor. 
VMwareTray.exe 
 





The wmiprvse.exe file is otherwise known as Windows 
Management Instrumentation. It is a Microsoft Windows-
based component that provides control and information about 
management in an enterprise environment. 
Developers use the wmiprvse.exe file in order to develop 
applications used for monitoring purposes. 
winlogon.exe 
 
Windows Logon Application (Windows logon manager). 




wpabaln.exe forms a part of the Microsoft Windows 






Wuauclt.exe is the AutoUpdate Client of Windows Update 
and is used to check for available updates (for the various 




B. WINDOWS 7 
Figure 9 below is a screen capture of the tasklist output from one of the Windows 
7 machines in our network. It shows many of the common processes for this OS. Table 
17 then provides the functions of these processes. 
 













Enables execute of a batch file. An executable that provides 
the command prompt (MS-DOS shell interpreter) for 
Windows NT family. 
conhost.exe 
 
conhost.exe is a Console Window Host, part of Microsoft 




Client-Server Runtime Server Subsystem- Needed to boot to 
Windows. Used to maintain the Win32 system environment 





dwm.exe is the Desktop Window Manager and is 
responsible for the graphical effects in Microsoft Windows 
Vista operating system such as 3D effects, live windows 






dllhost.exe is a process belonging to Microsoft Windows 
Operating System. The dllhost.exe file manages DLL-based 
applications. This program is important for the stable and 







The explorer.exe (located in the C:\WINDOWS folder), 
manages the Windows Graphical Shell including the Start 
Menu, Taskbar, Desktop, and File Manager. Without it 
running, the graphical interface for Windows will disappear. 
(The iertutil.dll is installed by Internet Explorer 7.) 
lsm.exe 
 
Local Session Manager Service associated with the System 
Management task of the platform. In some platforms, it 
manages the connections related to the terminal server on 




(LSA Security Service) - Needed to boot to Windows. The 
Local Security Authority server process. lsass .exe is a Lite 




The Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator is an 
application that is primarily used in allowing several other 
client applications to include more than one source of data in 






SearchIndexer.exe is the Windows service that handles 
indexing of files for Windows Search, which fuels the file 
search engine built into Windows that powers everything 
from the Start Menu search box to Windows Explorer, and 
even the Libraries feature. 





System Idle Process is not a process, more a counter which 
is displayed in WinTasks used for measuring how much idle 
time the CPU is having at any particular time. This counter 
will display how much CPU Resources, as a percentage are 




Non-system processes like [system process] originate from 








(Windows NT Session Manager) - Needed to boot to 
Windows. Used to establish the Windows XP environment 
during bootup. 
smss.exe is a process which is a part of the Microsoft 
Windows Operating System. It is called the Session 
Manager Subsystem and is responsible for handling sessions 








(Services and Controller app) - Needed to boot to Windows. 
Main Service file for Plug and Play. services.exe is a part of 
the Microsoft Windows Operating System and manages the 
operation of starting and stopping services. This process also 
deals with the automatic starting of services during the 







(Generic Host Process for Win32 Services) - Needed to boot 
to Windows. 
The file svchost.exe is the Generic Host Process for Win32 
Services used for administering 16-bit-based dynamically 
linked library files (DLL files) including other 






The spoolsv.exe file is described as the Spooler SubSystem 
App or Windows Print Spooler Service and is the main 
component of the printing interfaces. The spoolsv.exe file is 
initialized when the computer starts, and it runs in the 






At startup, Windows automatically runs the sppsvc.exe file 
which creates the Software Protection Platform 
Service.  This service is used by Windows 7 to (among other 
things) monitor its own protected system files to ensure they 




tasklist.exe displays a list of applications and services with 
their Process ID (PID) for all tasks running on either a local 







The taskhost.exe is a Task Host which is a generic Host 
Process for Windows 7 32-bit Services. This generic process 
acts as a host for processes that run from DLLs. At startup 
of the system the TASKHOST checks the number of 
Services in the Registry and builds a list of DLL-based 





The VMware Tools service (vmtoolsd.exe on Windows 
guests or vmtoolsd on Linux and Solaris guests). This 
service synchronizes the time in the guest operating system 
with the time in the host operating system. On Windows 
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VMwareTray.exe provides quick access to the most 




The wmiprvse.exe file is otherwise known as Windows 
Management Instrumentation. It is a Microsoft Windows-
based component that provides control and information 
about management in an enterprise environment. 
Developers use the wmiprvse.exe file in order to develop 
applications used for monitoring purposes. 
 
winlogon.exe 
Windows Logon Application (Windows logon manager). 







Wininit.exe was created to allow uninstallers to run and 
process commands stored in the file WinInit.ini. This allows 
programs to take action while the computer is still booting 
up. In Windows 7 and Vista, it primarily acts as a launcher 
for the majority of the background applications that are 
always running. 
 
C. SERVER 2003 
Figure 10 below is a screen capture of the tasklist output from one of the 
Windows Server 2003 machines in our network. It shows many of the common processes 
for this OS. Table 18 then provides the functions of these processes. 
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Figure 10.  Typical Windows Server 2003 process list 
 





Enables execute of a batch file. An executable that provides 
the command prompt (MS-DOS shell interpreter) for 
Windows NT family. 
csrss.exe 
Needed to boot to Windows. Used to maintain the Win32 




dns.exe is the main process which handles the Microsoft 
Windows DNS server, if enabled. This program is important 





dfssvc.exe is the Distributed File System service. Only found 
on Microsoft Windows Server suites, this process is crucial 







dllhost.exe is a process belonging to Microsoft Windows 
Operating System. The dllhost.exe file manages DLL based 
applications. This program is important for the stable and 







The explorer.exe (located in the C:\WINDOWS folder), 
manages the Windows Graphical Shell including the Start 
Menu, Taskbar, Desktop, and File Manager. Without it 
running, the graphical interface for Windows will disappear. 




ismserv.exe allows messages to be sent via Microsoft 
Windows server sites. This is a non-essential process. 




(LSA Security Service) - Needed to boot to Windows. The 
Local Security Authority server process. lsass .exe is a Lite 




The Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator is an 
application that is primarily used in allowing several other 
client applications to include more than one source of data in 
a single transaction. 
 
ntfrs.exe 
It is used to maintain file synchronization of file directory 
contents among multiple servers. 





System Idle Process is not a process, more a counter which is 
displayed in WinTasks used for measuring how much idle 
time the CPU is having at any particular time. This counter 
will display how much CPU Resources, as a percentage are 
‘idle’ and available for use. 
 
System 
Non-system processes like [system process] originate from 








(Windows NT Session Manager) - Needed to boot to 
Windows. Used to establish the Windows XP environment 
during bootup. 
smss.exe is a process which is a part of the Microsoft 
Windows Operating System. It is called the Session Manager 









(Services and Controller app) - Needed to boot to Windows. 
Main Service file for Plug and Play. services.exe is a part of 
the Microsoft Windows Operating System and manages the 
operation of starting and stopping services.This process also 
deals with the automatic starting of services during the 










The file svchost.exe is the Generic Host Process for Win32 
Services used for administering 16-bit-based dynamically 







The spoolsv.exe file is described as the Spooler SubSystem 
App or Windows Print Spooler Service and is the main 
component of the printing interfaces. The spoolsv.exe file is 
initialized when the computer starts, and it runs in the 




tasklist.exe displays a list of applications and services with 
their Process ID (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or 





tcpsvcs.exe is a part of Microsoft Windows networking 
components. This essential system process is initiated when 
the computer uses special TCP/IP networking services such as 






The VMware Tools service (vmtoolsd.exe on Windows guests 
or vmtoolsd on Linux and Solaris guests). This service 
synchronizes the time in the guest operating system with the 
time in the host operating system. On Windows guests, it also 
controls grabbing and releasing the mouse cursor. 
vmacthlp.exe VMware Physical Disk Help Service 
 
VMwareTray.exe 





The wmiprvse.exe file is otherwise known as Windows 
Management Instrumentation. It is a Microsoft Windows-
based component that provides control and information about 
management in an enterprise environment. 
Developers use the wmiprvse.exe file in order to develop 
applications used for monitoring purposes. 
 
winlogon.exe 
Windows Logon Application (Windows logon manager). 







Wininit.exe was created to allow uninstallers to run and 
process commands stored in the file WinInit.ini. This allows 
programs to take action while the computer is still booting up. 
In Windows 7 and Vista, it primarily acts as a launcher for the 





wpabaln.exe forms a part of the Microsoft Windows 






Wuauclt.exe is the AutoUpdate Client of Windows Update 
and is used to check for available updates (for the various 
versions of the MS Windows platform) from Microsoft 
Update. 
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D. SERVER 2008 
Figure11 below is a screen capture of the tasklist output from one of the Windows 
Server 2008 machines in our network. It shows many of the common processes for this 
OS. Table 19 then provides the functions of these processes. 
 












Enables execute of a batch file. An executable that 
provides the command prompt (MS-DOS shell 
interpreter) for Windows NT family. 
csrss.exe Needed to boot to Windows. Used to maintain the Win32 






dwm.exe is the Desktop Window Manager and is 
responsible for the graphical effects in Microsoft 
Windows Vista operating system such as 3D effects, live 








Distributed File System Replication. A distributed file 
system is a system where network folders are accessed by 
users on a network but where the files inside those folders 
are not necessarily all on the same server - some files 
may be stored on one server, while other files on another 
server, etc.., but the entire folder appears as one folder to 





dns.exe is the main process which handles the Microsoft 
Windows DNS server, if enabled. This program is 
important for the stable and secure running of the server 




dfssvc.exe is the Distributed File System service. Only 
found on Microsoft Windows Server suites, this process 






dllhost.exe is a process belonging to Microsoft Windows 
Operating System. The dllhost.exe file manages DLL 
based applications. This program is important for the 
stable and secure operation of the computer and should 






The explorer.exe (located in the C:\WINDOWS folder), 
manages the Windows Graphical Shell including the Start 
Menu, Taskbar, Desktop, and File Manager. Without it 
running, the graphical interface for Windows will 





ismserv.exe allows messages to be sent via Microsoft 
Windows server sites. This is a non-essential process. 




Local Session Manager Service associated with the 
System Management task of the platform. In some 
platform, it manages the connections related to the 





(LSA Security Service) - Needed to boot to Windows. 
The Local Security Authority server process. lsass .exe is 





The Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator is an 
application that is primarily used in allowing several 
other client applications to include more than one source 
of data in a single transaction. 




mmc.exe is the Microsoft Management Console 
application and is used to display various management 




It is used to maintain file synchronization of file directory 
contents among multiple servers. 
 
SLsvc.exe 
slsvc.exe is a Software Licensing Service, used to protect 
digital products from copyright infringement. 
 
 
System Idle Process 
 
 
System Idle Process is not a process, more a counter 
which is displayed in WinTasks used for measuring how 
much idle time the CPU is having at any particular time. 
This counter will display how much CPU Resources, as a 
percentage are ‘idle’ and available for use. 
 
System 
Non-system processes like [system process] originate 








(Windows NT Session Manager) - Needed to boot to 
Windows. Used to establish the Windows XP 
environment during bootup. 
smss.exe is a process which is a part of the Microsoft 
Windows Operating System. It is called the Session 
Manager Subsystem and is responsible for handling 








(Services and Controller app) - Needed to boot to 
Windows. Main Service file for Plug and Play. 
services.exe is a part of the Microsoft Windows 
Operating System and manages the operation of starting 
and stopping services.This process also deals with the 
automatic starting of services during the computer’s boot-







(Generic Host Process for Win32 Services) - Needed to 
boot to Windows. 
The file svchost.exe is the Generic Host Process for 
Win32 Services used for administering 16-bit-based 
dynamically linked library files (DLL files) including 
other supplementary support applications. 
 
spoolsv.exe 
The spoolsv.exe file is described as the Spooler 





the main component of the printing interfaces. The 
spoolsv.exe file is initialized when the computer starts, 





tasklist.exe displays a list of applications and services 
with their Process ID (PID) for all tasks running on either 
a local or a remote computer. 
 
taskeng.exe 
Task Scheduler Engine is responsible for running certain 
process at pre-defined times. 
 
TrustedInstaller.exe 
trustedinstaller.exe is a Windows Modules Installer and it 






The VMware Tools service (vmtoolsd.exe on Windows 
guests or vmtoolsd on Linux and Solaris guests). This 
service synchronizes the time in the guest operating 
system with the time in the host operating system. On 
Windows guests, it also controls grabbing and releasing 
the mouse cursor. 
 
VMwareTray.exe 
VMwareTray.exe provides quick access to the most 







The wmiprvse.exe file is otherwise known as Windows 
Management Instrumentation. It is a Microsoft Windows-
based component that provides control and information 
about management in an enterprise environment. 
Developers use the wmiprvse.exe file in order to develop 







Wininit.exe was created to allow uninstallers to run and 
process commands stored in the file WinInit.ini. This 
allows programs to take action while the computer is still 
booting up. In Windows 7 and Vista, it primarily acts as a 
launcher for the majority of the background applications 





Wuauclt.exe is the AutoUpdate Client of Windows 
Update and is used to check for available updates (for the 
various versions of the MS Windows platform) from 
Microsoft Update. 
 
E. SERVER 2012 
Figure 12 is a screen capture of the tasklist output from one of the Windows 
Server 2012 machines in our network. It shows many of the common processes for this 
OS. Table 20 then provides the functions of these processes. 
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Enables execute of a batch file. An executable that 
provides the command prompt (MS-DOS shell 
interpreter) for Windows NT family. 
conhost.exe 
 
conhost.exe is a Console Window Host, part of Microsoft 




Needed to boot to Windows. Used to maintain the Win32 
system environment console and other essential 
functions. 
dwm.exe dwm.exe is the Desktop Window Manager and is 
responsible for the graphical effects in Microsoft 
Windows Vista operating system such as 3D effects, live 








Distributed File System Replication. A distributed file 
system is a system where network folders are accessed by 
users on a network but where the files inside those folders 
are not necessarily all on the same server - some files 
may be stored on one server, while other files on another 
server, etc.., but the entire folder appears as one folder to 




dns.exe is the main process which handles the Microsoft 
Windows DNS server, if enabled. This program is 
important for the stable and secure running of the server 
and should not be terminated. 
dfssvc.exe dfssvc.exe is the Distributed File System service. Only 
found on Microsoft Windows Server suites, this process 






dllhost.exe is a process belonging to Microsoft Windows 
Operating System. The dllhost.exe file manages DLL 
based applications. This program is important for the 
stable and secure operation of the computer and should 






The explorer.exe (located in the C:\WINDOWS folder), 
manages the Windows Graphical Shell including the Start 
Menu, Taskbar, Desktop, and File Manager. Without it 
running, the graphical interface for Windows will 





ismserv.exe allows messages to be sent via Microsoft 
Windows server sites. This is a non-essential process. 




(LSA Security Service) - Needed to boot to Windows. 
The Local Security Authority server process. lsass .exe is 





The Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator is an 
application that is primarily used in allowing several 
other client applications to include more than one source 
of data in a single transaction. 
Microsoft.ActiveDirectory Active Directory is a special-purpose database. 





System Idle Process is not a process, more a counter 
which is displayed in WinTasks used for measuring how 
much idle time the CPU is having at any particular time. 
This counter will display how much CPU Resources, as a 
percentage are ‘idle’ and available for use. 
 
System 
Non-system processes like [system process] originate 








(Windows NT Session Manager) - Needed to boot to 
Windows. Used to establish the Windows XP 
environment during bootup. 
smss.exe is a process which is a part of the Microsoft 
Windows Operating System. It is called the Session 
Manager Subsystem and is responsible for handling 








(Services and Controller app) - Needed to boot to 
Windows. Main Service file for Plug and Play. 
services.exe is a part of the Microsoft Windows 
Operating System and manages the operation of starting 
and stopping services.This process also deals with the 
automatic starting of services during the computers boot-






(Generic Host Process for Win32 Services) - Needed to 
boot to Windows. 
The file svchost.exe is the Generic Host Process for 
Win32 Services used for administering 16-bit-based 
dynamically linked library files (DLL files) including 






The spoolsv.exe file is described as the Spooler 
SubSystem App or Windows Print Spooler Service and is 
the main component of the printing interfaces. The 
spoolsv.exe file is initialized when the computer starts, 







At startup, Windows automatically runs the sppsvc.exe 
file which creates the Software Protection Platform 
Service.  This service is used by Windows 7 to (among 
other things) monitor its own protected system files to 
ensure they are not modified.  
 
SppExtComObj.Exe 
sppextcomobj.exe is filename of the process running on 












ServerManager.exe enables users to perform automated 
installations or removals of roles, role services, and 
features. ServerManagerCmd.exe options enable users to 
view logs of its operations and to run queries to display 
lists of roles, role services, and features that are both 




tasklist.exe displays a list of applications and services 
with their Process ID (PID) for all tasks running on either 







The taskhost.exe is a Task Host which is a generic Host 
Process for Windows 7 32-bit Services. This generic 
process acts as a host for processes that run from DLLs. 
At startup of the system the TASKHOST checks the 
number of Services in the Registry and builds a list of 







The VMware Tools service (vmtoolsd.exe on Windows 
guests or vmtoolsd on Linux and Solaris guests). This 
service synchronizes the time in the guest operating 
system with the time in the host operating system. On 
Windows guests, it also controls grabbing and releasing 
the mouse cursor. 
 
vds.exe 
vds.exe is a Virtual Disk Service and it Provides 
management services for disks, volumes, file systems, 
and storage arrays 
VMwareTray.exe 
 
VMwareTray.exe provides quick access to the most 




The wmiprvse.exe file is otherwise known as Windows 
Management Instrumentation. It is a Microsoft Windows-
based component that provides control and information 
about management in an enterprise environment. 
Developers use the wmiprvse.exe file in order to develop 
applications used for monitoring purposes. 
wlms.exe Windows License Monitoring Service 
winlogon.exe Windows Logon Application (Windows logon manager). 







Wininit.exe was created to allow uninstallers to run and 
process commands stored in the file WinInit.ini. This 
allows programs to take action while the computer is still 
booting up. In Windows 7 and Vista, it primarily acts as a 
launcher for the majority of the background applications 
that are always running. 
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APPENDIX C. BATCH FILE CONTENTS 
This appendix provides the contents of the two batch files we used to automate 
the deployment of the tools. The first tool is connect.bat. This batch file copies the second 
batch file toolscript.bat to the administrative share on every machine in the network. It 
then uses the psexec tool to remotely connect to each machine and execute the 
toolscript,bat file. The toolscript.bat file then runs each tool on the remote machines 
redirecting the output to file on the Triage machine. 
A. CONNECT.BAT 
cd c:\tools 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\alphadc01\admin$ 
psexec \\alphadc01 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\alphafs01\admin$ 
psexec \\alphafs01 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\alphaex01\admin$ 
psexec \\alphaex01 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\alphawww1\admin$ 
psexec \\alphawww1 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\alphaws01\admin$ 
psexec \\alphaws01 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\alphaws02\admin$ 
psexec \\alphaws02 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\alphaws03\admin$ 
psexec \\alphaws003 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\alphaws04\admin$ 
psexec \\alphaws04 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\alphaws05\admin$ 
psexec \\alphaws05 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\alphaws06\admin$ 
psexec \\alphaws06 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\bravodc01\admin$ 
psexec \\bravodc01 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\bravoex01\admin$ 
psexec \\bravoex01 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\bravofs01\admin$ 
psexec \\bravofs01 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\bravowww1\admin$ 
psexec \\bravowww1 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\bravows01\admin$ 
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psexec \\bravows01 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\bravows02\admin$ 
psexec \\bravows02 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\bravows03\admin$ 
psexec \\bravows03 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\bravows04\admin$ 
psexec \\bravows04 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\bravows05\admin$ 
psexec \\bravows05 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\bravows06\admin$ 
psexec \\bravows06 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\charliedc01\admin$ 
psexec \\charliedc01 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\charliefs01\admin$ 
psexec \\charliefs01 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\charlieex01\admin$ 
psexec \\charlieex01 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\charliewww1\admin$ 
psexec \\charliewww1 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\charliews01\admin$ 
psexec \\charliews01 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\charliews02\admin$ 
psexec \\charliews02 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\charliews03\admin$ 
psexec \\charliews03 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\charliews04\admin$ 
psexec \\charliews04 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\charliews05\admin$ 
psexec \\charliews05 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
copy c:\tools\toolscript.bat \\charliews06\admin$ 
psexec \\charliews06 -u alpha\administrator -p P@$$w0rd c:\windows\toolscript.bat 
 
B. TOOLSCRIPT.BAT 
date /t >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
time /t >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\sigcheck -accepteula -e -u c:\windows\system32 >> \\triage\tools\
results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\psloggedon -accepteula >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\logonsessions -p -accepteula >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\net session >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\pslist -accepteula >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\tasklist >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\listdlls -accepteula >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\handle -accepteula >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
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\\triage\tools\ipconfig /all >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\netstat -an >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\net use >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\net share >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\nbtstat -nrs >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\nbtstat -c >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\net start >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\sc query >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\psservice -accepteula >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\driverquery >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\autorunsc -a -accepteula >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\reg.exe query “HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session 
Manager” >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\reg.exe query “HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session 
Manager\Memory Management” >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\reg.exe query “HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session 
Manager\FileRenameOperations” >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\reg.exe query “HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session 
Manager\Environment” >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\reg.exe query “HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Hivelist” >> 
\\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\reg.exe query “HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl” 
>> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\reg.exe query “HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\
Component Based Servicing\Packages” >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\reg.exe query “HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\
Winlogon” >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
\\triage\tools\reg.exe query “HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\
AeDebug” >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
dir /A /T:W /O:D C:\windows\Tasks >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
dir /A /T:A /O:D C:\windows\Tasks >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
dir /A /T:C /O:D C:\windows\Tasks >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
dir /A /T:W /O:D C:\windows\ >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
dir /A /T:A /O:D C:\windows\ >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
dir /A /T:C /O:D C:\windows\ >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
dir /A /T:W /O:D C:\windows\system32 >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
dir /A /T:A /O:D C:\windows\system32 >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
dir /A /T:C /O:D C:\windows\system32 >> \\triage\tools\results\%computername%.txt 
dir /A /T:W /O:D C:\windows\system32\drivers >> \\triage\tools\
results\%computername%.txt 
dir /A /T:A /O:D C:\windows\system32\drivers >> \\triage\tools\
results\%computername%.txt 
dir /A /T:C /O:D C:\windows\system32\drivers >> \\triage\tools\
results\%computername%.txt 
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dir /A /T:C /O:D C:\windows\system32\config >> \\triage\tools\
results\%computername%.txt 
dir /A /T:A /O:D C:\windows\system32\config >> \\triage\tools\
results\%computername%.txt 
dir /A /T:W /O:D C:\windows\system32\config >> \\triage\tools\
results\%computername%.txt 











APPENDIX D.  INSTALLATION AND CONFIGURATION OF 
POISON IVY 
This appendix provides the steps we took to install and configure Poison Ivy for 
this capstone project. 
A. INSTALLING POISON IVY 
1. Point the browser to http://www.poisonivy-rat.com/index.php?link=download 
2. Figure 13 shows the Poison Ivy website and where to download Poison Ivy 2.3.2 
 
Figure 13.  Poison Ivy website 
 
3. Click next to mirror 1 to download, and click save file when the dialog box shown 
in Figure 14 appears. 
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Figure 14.  Pop-up dialog box 
 
4. For Linux, to extract .rar files (Roshal ARchive) 
5. Run sudo apt-get install unrar 
6. Type unrar e PI2.3.2.rar. Figure 15 shows this command in progress. 
 
Figure 15.  Unzipping the Poison Ivy package 
 
B. BUILDING POISON IVY SERVER 
1. DoubleClick on the Poison Ivy 2.3.2.exe and accept the Terms and 
Conditions EULA. 
2. Select “File” -> “New Server” 





Figure 16.  Poison Ivy profile window 
 
4. Click “Add” to add the DNS/Port as shown in the connection console in 
Figure 17. 
5. If using proxy i.e., no-ip etc 
6. If using a key, generate will generate a new key or load will load an 




 Figure 17.  Connection console 
7. Within the install console as shown in Figure 18 provide any file name 
you want to use with a .exe extension 
 
Figure 18.  Poison Ivy install console 
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8. Click Icon and select the icon image/picture. 
9. Click Generate to build the server file and save as shown in the Advanced 











Figure 19.  Poison Ivy advanced console 
10. Click Ok 
11. Once the server is created; 
12. Give it permission using chmod 777 
13. Set up the network i.e., open the firewall to accept connections TCP/UDP 
port 3460 
14. Check that software firewalls allows Poison Ivy client to listen 





C. BUILDING POISON IVY CLIENT 
1. Start the client – go to “File” – “New Client” Menu, enter the pertinent 













Figure 20.  Poison Ivy client interface 
2. Click start and the system is ready to accept connections. (once connected, 
it will pop-up) 







Enter the port  the 
Enter the password 
same as the server  
Use key if needed 
 84 
APPENDIX E.  PROPOSED LINUX TOOLSET LIST 
This appendix contains a list of proposed tools to be included in a toolkit built for 
detecting IOCs in Linux operating systems. 
./date                     
./uname -a 
./who     
./ps -efH               
./lsof 
./ifconfig -a                 
./netstat -anps         
./netstat -an             
./netstat -rn              
./cat /var/lock/subsys/iptables     
./ls -la /var/lock/subsys 
./mount 
./cat /etc/fstab         
./lsmod     
./pwd 
./cat /root/.bash_history     
chmod 744 find 
./find / -printf “%m;%Ax;%AT;%Tx;%TT;%Cx;%CT;%U;%G;%s;%p\n” > 
filetimes 




./cat /etc/anacrontab    
./cat /etc/passwd  
./cat /etc/shadow    
./cat /etc/group   
./cat /etc/syslog.conf   
./cat /var/log/messages        




./last             
./cat /var/log/secure.1 
./find / -type f -xdev -exec md5sum -b {} \; > filesums   
history of additional users ~username/.bash_history 
./ps -ef | ./grep “lkl”      
file /proc/1900/exe        
./strings -a /proc/1900/exe 
./hexdump -C /proc/1900/exe 
file /any/linked/file         
stat /any/linked/file       
stat /usr/bin/.text/ircd/src/ircd 
diff /usr/bin/.text/lkl/lkl /proc/1900/exe 
./cat /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit         
./cat /etc/inittab 
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APPENDIX F. TOOL OUTPUT WITH NO IOCS 
This appendix provides the output from each of the tools that presented no IOCs 
when we performed the analysis. 
Table 21. Psloggedon output 
 
Users logged on locally: 
     8/18/2014 3:57:01 PM     ALPHA\administrator 
 
Users logged on via resource shares: 
     8/22/2014 11:11:03 AM     TRIAGE\Administrator 
 
Table 22. Net session output 
 
Baseline Output Infected Output 





\\10.1.0.2             Administrator                              4 00:00:00     
The command completed successfully. 
 





\\10.1.0.2             Administrator                              4 00:00:00     
The command completed successfully. 
 
Table 23. Tasklist output 
 
Baseline Output Infected Output 




System Idle Process 0 Services 0 
System  4 Services 0 
smss.exe  252 Services 0 
csrss.exe  336 Services 0 
wininit.exe 384 Services 0 
csrss.exe  396 Console 1 
winlogon.exe 436 Console 1 
services.exe 480 Services 0 
lsass.exe  488 Services 0 
lsm.exe  496 Services 0 




System Idle Process 0  Services  0         24 K 
System  4  Services  0        640 K 
smss.exe  252  Services  0        532 K 
csrss.exe   336  Services  0      2,580 K 
wininit.exe  384  Services   0      2,664 K 
csrss.exe    396  Console  1      4,384 K 
winlogon.exe  436  Console   1      3,908 K 
services.exe   480  Services  0      6,780 K 
lsass.exe    492  Services  0      7,876 K 
lsm.exe     500  Services 0      2,480 K 
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svchost.exe 600 Services 0 
svchost.exe 680 Services 0 
svchost.exe 804 Services 0 
svchost.exe 840 Services 0 
svchost.exe 880 Services 0 
svchost.exe 988 Services 0 
svchost.exe 1084 Services 0 
spoolsv.exe 1172 Services 0 
svchost.exe 1208 Services 0 
svchost.exe 1332 Services 0 
svchost.exe 1752 Services 0 
svchost.exe 1872 Services 0 
sppsvc.exe  312 Services 0 
SearchIndexer.exe 1428 Services 0 
taskhost.exe 868 Console 1 
dwm.exe  1296 Console 1 
explorer.exe 1504 Console 1 
cmd.exe  1540 Console 1 
conhost.exe 1108 Console 1 
iexplore.exe 3788 Console 1 
iexplore.exe 3872 Console 1 
PSEXESVC.exe 3172 Services 0 
cmd.exe  2040 Services 0 
conhost.exe 1188  Services 0 
tasklist.exe 2144  Services 0 
WmiPrvSE.exe 3192 Services 0 
svchost.exe   604  Services  0      5,408 K 
svchost.exe   668  Services  0      4,456 K 
svchost.exe   716  Services   0     10,000 K 
svchost.exe   840  Services  0     33,732 K 
svchost.exe   880  Services    0     20,308 K 
svchost.exe   988  Services 0      8,312 K 
svchost.exe  1080  Services    0      9,544 K 
spoolsv.exe   1172  Services 0      7,636 K 
svchost.exe   1208  Services    0      6,500 K 
svchost.exe   1332  Services  0      5,396 K 
svchost.exe  1756  Services   0      3,464 K 
svchost.exe  1984  Services     0      5,164 K 
taskhost.exe  1416  Console    1      5,240 K 
sppsvc.exe  2036  Services    0      6,764 K 
dwm.exe    1672  Console   1      3,644 K 
explorer.exe   1816  Console    1     40,004 K 
SearchIndexer.exe  972 S Services   0      8,524 K 
wmpnetwk.exe   1976  Services   0      2,860 K 
iexplore.exe    3652  Console  1      4,368 K 
PSEXESVC.exe   3852  Services 0      4,320 K 
cmd.exe    312 S Services 0      2,512 K 
conhost.exe  10184  Services  0      2,204 K 
tasklist.exe  9000  Services 0      3,904 K 
WmiPrvSE.exe  8836  Services 0      4,540 K 
 
 
Table 24. Ipconfig /all output 
 
Windows IP Configuration 
 
   Host Name . . . . . . . . . . . . : ALPHAWS01 
   Primary Dns Suffix  . . . . . . . : alpha.aco 
   Node Type . . . . . . . . . . . . : Hybrid 
   IP Routing Enabled. . . . . . . . : No 
   WINS Proxy Enabled. . . . . . . . : No 
   DNS Suffix Search List. . . . . . : alpha.aco 
 
Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection: 
 
   Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . :  
   Description . . . . . . . . . . . : Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection 
   Physical Address. . . . . . . . . : 00–50-56-9C-73-C3 
   DHCP Enabled. . . . . . . . . . . : Yes 
   Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes 
   Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::8d90:fc57:31de:2927%11(Preferred)  
   IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 10.1.0.25(Preferred)  
   Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.0.0 
   Default Gateway . . . . . . . . . : 10.1.0.1 
   DHCPv6 IAID . . . . . . . . . . . : 234901590 
   DHCPv6 Client DUID. . . . . . . . : 00–01-00-01-1A-D6-66-1C-00-50-56-9C-73-B7 
   DNS Servers . . . . . . . . . . . : 10.1.0.21 
   NetBIOS over Tcpip. . . . . . . . : Enabled 
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Tunnel adapter isatap.{1575A306-ABD2-4822-997A-DE9A41818D65}: 
 
   Media State . . . . . . . . . . . : Media disconnected 
   Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . :  
   Description . . . . . . . . . . . : Microsoft ISATAP Adapter 
   Physical Address. . . . . . . . . : 00–00-00-00-00-00-00-E0 
   DHCP Enabled. . . . . . . . . . . : No 
   Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes 
 
Table 25. Net share output 
 
Share name   Resource                        Remark 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
C$                 C:\                             Default share                      
IPC$                                               Remote IPC                         
ADMIN$      C:\Windows              Remote Admin                       
The command completed successfully. 
 
Table 26. Nbtstat –nrs output 
 
Local Area Connection: 
Node IpAddress: [10.1.0.25] Scope Id: [] 
                  NetBIOS Remote Cache Name Table 
Name               Type Host Address           Life [sec] 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
10.1.0.2       <20> UNIQUE 10.1.0.2            595 
ALPHAWS03 <20> UNIQUE 10.1.0.27           32 
These Windows services are started: 
 
 
Table 27. Net start output 
 
Baseline Scan Infected Scan 
These Windows services are started: 
 
   Application Experience 
   Base Filtering Engine 
   COM+ Event System 
   Computer Browser 
   Cryptographic Services 
These Windows services are started: 
 
    
   Base Filtering Engine 
   COM+ Event System 
   Computer Browser 
   Cryptographic Services 
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   DCOM Server Process Launcher 
   Desktop Window Manager Session Manager 
   DHCP Client 
   Diagnostic Policy Service 
   Diagnostic Service Host 
   Distributed Link Tracking Client 
   DNS Client 
   Function Discovery Resource Publication 
   Group Policy Client 
   IKE and AuthIP IPsec Keying Modules 
   IP Helper 
   IPsec Policy Agent 
   Netlogon 
   Network Connections 
   Network List Service 
   Network Location Awareness 
   Network Store Interface Service 
   Offline Files 
   Plug and Play 
   Power 
   Print Spooler 
   PSEXESVC 
   Remote Procedure Call (RPC) 
   RPC Endpoint Mapper 
   Security Accounts Manager 
   Security Center 
   Server 
   Shell Hardware Detection 
   Software Protection 
   SPP Notification Service 
   Superfetch 
   System Event Notification Service 
   Task Scheduler 
   TCP/IP NetBIOS Helper 
   Themes 
   User Profile Service 
   Windows Audio 
   Windows Audio Endpoint Builder 
   Windows Defender 
   Windows Event Log 
   Windows Firewall 
   Windows Management Instrumentation 
   Windows Search 
   Windows Time 
   Windows Update 
   Workstation 
 
The command completed successfully. 
   DCOM Server Process Launcher 
   Desktop Window Manager Session Manager 
   DHCP Client 
   Diagnostic Policy Service 
   Diagnostic Service Host 
   Distributed Link Tracking Client 
   DNS Client 
   Function Discovery Resource Publication 
   Group Policy Client 
   IKE and AuthIP IPsec Keying Modules 
   IP Helper 
   IPsec Policy Agent 
   Netlogon 
   Network Connections 
   Network List Service 
   Network Location Awareness 
   Network Store Interface Service 
   Offline Files 
   Plug and Play 
   Power 
   Print Spooler 
   Program Compatibility Assistant Service 
   PSEXESVC 
   Remote Procedure Call (RPC) 
   RPC Endpoint Mapper 
   Security Accounts Manager 
   Security Center 
   Server 
   Shell Hardware Detection 
   Software Protection 
   SPP Notification Service 
   SSDP Discovery 
   Superfetch 
   System Event Notification Service 
   Task Scheduler 
   TCP/IP NetBIOS Helper 
   Themes 
   User Profile Service 
   Windows Audio 
   Windows Audio Endpoint Builder 
   Windows Defender 
   Windows Event Log 
   Windows Firewall 
   Windows Management Instrumentation 
   Windows Media Player Network Sharing Service 
   Windows Search 
   Windows Time 
   Windows Update 
   Workstation 
 





Table 28. Sc query output 
SERVICE_NAME: WMPNetworkSvc 
DISPLAY_NAME: Windows Media Player Network Sharing Service 
        TYPE               : 10  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS   
        STATE              : 4  RUNNING  
                                (STOPPABLE, NOT_PAUSABLE, IGNORES_SHUTDOWN) 
        WIN32_EXIT_CODE    : 0  (0x0) 
        SERVICE_EXIT_CODE  : 0  (0x0) 
        CHECKPOINT         : 0x0 
        WAIT_HINT          : 0x0 
Table 29. Psservice output 
 
SERVICE_NAME: WMPNetworkSvc 
DISPLAY_NAME: Windows Media Player Network Sharing Service 
Shares Windows Media Player libraries to other networked players and media devices using 
Universal Plug and Play 
 TYPE    : 10 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS  
 STATE    : 4  RUNNING 
          (STOPPABLE,NOT_PAUSABLE,IGNORES_SHUTDOWN) 
 WIN32_EXIT_CODE   : 0  (0x0) 
 SERVICE_EXIT_CODE : 0  (0x0) 
 CHECKPOINT   : 0x0 
 WAIT_HINT   : 0 ms 
 
Table 30. Driverquery output 
 
Module Name         Display Name                         Driver Type   Link Date 
============ ====================== ============= ====================== 
1394ohci      1394 OHCI Compliant Ho  Kernel        7/13/2009 4:51:59 PM 
ACPI          Microsoft ACPI Driver   Kernel        7/13/2009 4:11:11 PM 
AcpiPmi       ACPI Power Meter Drive  Kernel        7/13/2009 4:16:36 PM 
adp94xx       adp94xx                  Kernel        12/5/2008 3:59:55 PM 
adpahci       adpahci                  Kernel        5/1/2007 10:29:26 AM 
<…content removed for write up…> 
WANARP        Remote Access IP ARP D  Kernel        7/13/2009 4:55:02 PM 
Wanarpv6      Remote Access IPv6 ARP  Kernel        7/13/2009 4:55:02 PM 
Wd            Wd                       Kernel        7/13/2009 4:11:31 PM 
Wdf01000      Kernel Mode Driver Fra  Kernel        7/13/2009 4:11:36 PM 
WfpLwf        WFP Lightweight Filter  Kernel        7/13/2009 4:53:51 PM 
WIMMount      WIMMount                File System   7/13/2009 4:17:57 PM 
WmiAcpi       Microsoft Windows Mana  Kernel        7/13/2009 4:19:16 PM 
ws2ifsl       Winsock IFS Driver      Kernel        7/13/2009 4:55:01 PM 




Table 31. Autorunsc output 
 
H K L M \ S y s t e m \ C u r r e n t C o n t r o l S e t \ S e r v i c e s  
  
 
           M i c r o s o f t   C o r p o r a t i o n  
  
           6 . 1 . 7 6 0 0 . 1 6 3 8 5  
  
           c : \ w i n d o w s \ s y s t e m 3 2 \ r p c s s . d l l  
  
           7 / 1 3 / 2 0 0 9   6 : 0 9   P M  
 
Table 32. Session manager registry key 
 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager 
    CriticalSectionTimeout    REG_DWORD    0x278d00 
    GlobalFlag    REG_DWORD    0x0 
    HeapDeCommitFreeBlockThreshold    REG_DWORD    0x0 
    HeapDeCommitTotalFreeThreshold    REG_DWORD    0x0 
    HeapSegmentCommit    REG_DWORD    0x0 
    HeapSegmentReserve    REG_DWORD    0x0 
    ProcessorControl    REG_DWORD    0x2 
    ResourceTimeoutCount    REG_DWORD    0x9e340 
    BootExecute    REG_MULTI_SZ    autocheck autochk * 
    ExcludeFromKnownDlls    REG_MULTI_SZ     
    ObjectDirectories    REG_MULTI_SZ    \Windows\0\RPC Control 
    ProtectionMode    REG_DWORD    0x1 
    NumberOfInitialSessions    REG_DWORD    0x2 

































    ClearPageFileAtShutdown    REG_DWORD    0x0 
    DisablePagingExecutive    REG_DWORD    0x0 
    LargeSystemCache    REG_DWORD    0x0 
    NonPagedPoolQuota    REG_DWORD    0x0 
    NonPagedPoolSize    REG_DWORD    0x0 
    PagedPoolQuota    REG_DWORD    0x0 
    PagedPoolSize    REG_DWORD    0x0 
    SecondLevelDataCache    REG_DWORD    0x0 
    SessionPoolSize    REG_DWORD    0x4 
    SessionViewSize    REG_DWORD    0x30 
    SystemPages    REG_DWORD    0x0 
    PagingFiles    REG_MULTI_SZ    ?:\pagefile.sys 
    PhysicalAddressExtension    REG_DWORD    0x1 












    ComSpec    REG_EXPAND_SZ    %SystemRoot%\system32\cmd.exe 
    FP_NO_HOST_CHECK    REG_SZ    NO 
    OS    REG_SZ    Windows_NT 
    Path    REG_EXPAND_SZ    
%SystemRoot%\system32;%SystemRoot%;%SystemRoot%\System32\
Wbem;%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\ 
    PATHEXT    REG_SZ    .COM;.EXE;.BAT;.CMD;.VBS;.VBE;.JS;.JSE;.WSF;.WSH;.MSC 
    PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE    REG_SZ    x86 
    TEMP    REG_EXPAND_SZ    %SystemRoot%\TEMP 
    TMP    REG_EXPAND_SZ    %SystemRoot%\TEMP 
    USERNAME    REG_SZ    SYSTEM 
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    windir    REG_EXPAND_SZ    %SystemRoot% 
    PSModulePath    REG_EXPAND_SZ    %SystemRoot%\system32\WindowsPowerShell\
v1.0\Modules\ 
    NUMBER_OF_PROCESSORS    REG_SZ    1 
    PROCESSOR_LEVEL    REG_SZ    6 
    PROCESSOR_IDENTIFIER    REG_SZ    x86 Family 6 Model 46 Stepping 6, GenuineIntel 
    PROCESSOR_REVISION    REG_SZ    2e06 
 
 
Table 35. Hivelist registry key 
 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Hivelist 
    \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE    REG_SZ     
    \REGISTRY\MACHINE\BCD00000000    REG_SZ    \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Boot\BCD 
    \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM    REG_SZ    \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\
System32\config\SYSTEM 
    \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE    REG_SZ    \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\
System32\config\SOFTWARE 
    \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT    REG_SZ    \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\
System32\config\DEFAULT 
    \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SECURITY    REG_SZ    \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\
System32\config\SECURITY 
    \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SAM    REG_SZ    \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\
config\SAM 
    \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20    REG_SZ    \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\
ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\NTUSER.DAT 
    \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-19    REG_SZ    \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\
ServiceProfiles\LocalService\NTUSER.DAT 
    \Registry\User\S-1-5-21-3079887268-1858392370-3246419219-500    REG_SZ    \Device\
HarddiskVolume2\Users\administrator\NTUSER.DAT 





Table 36. CrashControl registry key 
 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl 
    AutoReboot    REG_DWORD    0x1 
    CrashDumpEnabled    REG_DWORD    0x2 
    Overwrite    REG_DWORD    0x1 
    LogEvent    REG_DWORD    0x1 
    MinidumpsCount    REG_DWORD    0x32 
    DumpFile    REG_EXPAND_SZ    %SystemRoot%\MEMORY.DMP 
    MinidumpDir    REG_EXPAND_SZ    %SystemRoot%\Minidump 
    DumpFilters    REG_MULTI_SZ    dumpfve.sys 
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Table 37. Winlogon registry key 
 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon 
    ReportBootOk    REG_SZ    1 
    Shell    REG_SZ    explorer.exe 
    PreCreateKnownFolders    REG_SZ    {A520A1A4-1780-4FF6-BD18-167343C5AF16} 
    Userinit    REG_SZ    C:\Windows\system32\userinit.exe, 
    VMApplet    REG_SZ    SystemPropertiesPerformance.exe /pagefile 
    AutoRestartShell    REG_DWORD    0x1 
    Background    REG_SZ    0 0 0 
    CachedLogonsCount    REG_SZ    10 
    DebugServerCommand    REG_SZ    no 
    ForceUnlockLogon    REG_DWORD    0x0 
    LegalNoticeCaption    REG_SZ     
    LegalNoticeText    REG_SZ     
    PasswordExpiryWarning    REG_DWORD    0x5 
    PowerdownAfterShutdown    REG_SZ    0 
    ShutdownWithoutLogon    REG_SZ    0 
    WinStationsDisabled    REG_SZ    0 
    DisableCAD    REG_DWORD    0x0 
    scremoveoption    REG_SZ    0 
    ShutdownFlags    REG_DWORD    0x27 
    AutoAdminLogon    REG_SZ    0 
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